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Summary 
Traditionally, it has been the flag states that have had the primary possibility 
to take action against, and prosecute criminal offences that have taken place 
on a vessel outside the territory of a coastal state. Through the EEZ regime 
in UNCLOS, this has started to change and through various “new” types of 
jurisdictions used in international conventions, other states can today be 
granted with legal ability to deal with these criminal activities, e.g. through 
the principles of nationality.  
This thesis concerns those opportunities a coastal state have to take action 
against three criminal offences: piracy, human trafficking and oil pollution 
and it is discussed whether there can be said to exist obligations in 
international law for a coastal state to take action against these crimes. The 
possible measures a state may undertake are depending on the prevailing 
jurisdictions in each maritime zone and the relevant exceptions to these 
jurisdictions.  
The criminal offences chosen illustrates three types of jurisdictions; 
universal jurisdiction, treaty-based jurisdiction, and jurisdiction based on a 
special regime found in UNCLOS, which may be considered as customary 
international law. Through this discussion, the variety of different 
possibilities for the coastal state to take action is presented. For the sake of 
clarity and structure, the presentation of a coastal state’s possibilities and 
potential responsibilities is discussed primarily on a zone-by-zone basis. 
In summary, the possible measures a state is allowed to take differ 
drastically depending on type of crime and zone. As an example, the coastal 
state has in its territorial sea full sovereignty for oil pollution incidents, 
while on the high seas it has, except the right of hot pursuit, practically no 
rights to act when considering the problematic use of the Intervention 
Convention. The situation is similar for the crime of transporting people 
subject to human trafficking, although the legal foundation differs. 
However, regarding crimes of piracy, the situation is much different due to 
the fact that piracy is considered as a jus cogens crime whose repression is 
granted with universal jurisdiction.  
The research undertaken has not showed any signs of obligations for an 
unwilling coastal state to take action against any of the crimes, at least not if 
conventions which are ratified on a voluntary basis, are disregarded. 
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Sammanfattning 
 
Det har taditionellt sätt varit primärt flaggstater som har haft skyldighet och 
möjlighet att väcka åtal för brott som har begåtts utanför en kuststats 
terratorium. Detta har börjat att förändras genom introducerandet av EEZ i 
UNCLOS och genom ”nya” jurisdiktionsformer i olika internationella 
konventioner, exempelvis nationalitetsprincipeln. 
Detta examensarbete kommer att behandla kuststatens möjligheter att vidta 
åtgärder mot tre specifika brott: kapning till sjöss, människohandel och 
oljeutsläpp. Det kommer även att diskuteras om det i international rätt finns 
någon skyldighet för kuststaten att vidta åtgärder mot dessa nämnda brott. 
Möjliga åtgärder som staten har rätt att vidta inom ramen för internationell 
rätt är beroende på vilken typ av jurisdiktioner som råder i de olika maritima 
zonerna och vilka undantag som kan vara aktuella i det enskilda fallet, och 
därför kommer kuststaternas möjligheter och potentiella skyldigheter främst 
presenteras zon för zon. 
De valda brotten speglar tre typer av jurisdiktionsformer; universell 
jurisdiktion, traktatbaserad jurisdiktion, samt jurisdiktion baserad på en 
särskild regim i UNCLOS, som kan anses vara kodifierad sedvanerätt. De 
möjliga åtgärdera en kuststat har rätt att vidta har visat skilja sig drastiskt 
mellan de olika brotten samt i de olika maritima zonerna. Till exempel så 
har kuststaten full suveränitet i terratorialhavet över oljeutsläpp, medan den 
på öppet hav endast har rätt till omedelbart förföljande (hot pursuit), om 
man bortser från den i praktiken svårtillämpade Interventions 
Konventionen
1
. Liknande resultat gäller för transport av personer utsatta för 
människohandel, även om den juridiska grunden är annorlunda. Dock så 
skiljer sig brottet kapning markant från de båda andra av den anledning att 
det är ett så kallat jus cogens brott vars förtryck är av sådan vikt att  det har 
gett upphov till universell jurisdiktion. 
Den forskning som åtagits har inte visat några tecken på skyldigheter hos 
ovilliga kuststater att vidta åtgärder, åtminstonde inte om man bortser från 
konventioner, som av naturen måste ratificeras av staten på frivillig basis.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties, 1969. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the most important aspects of state sovereignty is a state’s authority 
to rule over its domain. This right has for many years also extended to parts 
of the waters adjacent to the state’s coastline, although the length of it has 
varied throughout history. Today a state’s authority over the waters is 
mainly depending on the distance from the coastline. A state may exercise 
almost complete sovereignty over waters closest to the coastline, limited 
sovereignty for enforcement reasons for an additional part and restricted 
authority for economic resources and marine pollution prevention for waters 
stretching up to 200 nautical miles from the state’s coast. It is in the coastal 
state’s interest to be able to protect its territory, whether it is from pollution 
damage or armed pirates, and it is thus important for states to have 
jurisdiction to take action against the imminent threat before it is too late 
and the damage has already occurred on state territory.  
One persistent problem in the maritime field is the notion of “flags of 
convenience”, or “open registries” as they are also known, where states 
allow, or at least do not try hard enough to prevent sub-standard vessels 
from sailing the seas and do not at all times provide sufficient enforcement 
measures against delinquent vessels when an offence is committed against 
international laws and standards. Amongst these “flags of convenience” the 
largest registries in the world can be found. This becomes interesting when 
considering that flag state jurisdiction has a very high priority in 
international law; on the high seas it even has, as a general rule, exclusive 
jurisdiction over registered vessels and their crews. Since it does not seem 
possible to reach a solution regarding this problem in the near future, one 
alternative measure could be to extend other states’ jurisdiction. If states 
other than the flag state have jurisdiction over a crime, not everything is 
depending on a state which may or may not be a “flag of convenience” for 
prosecution and further prevention of such criminal activities. 
This thesis will examine whether a coastal state has the ability under 
international law to take action against three varieties of criminal offences in 
that state’s maritime zones, as well as on the high seas. It will also be 
discussed what actions these offences include in international law and how 
they gain their legitimacy. For this to be feasible there is a need to discuss 
how the coastal state’s jurisdiction in various maritime zones is compatible 
with the principle of flag state jurisdiction. The three offences that this 
thesis focuses on are piracy, transport at sea of people subject to human 
trafficking, and vessel-sourced oil pollution.  
These crimes have been chosen due to the diversity between how they can 
be accessed legally in international law. Piracy is, as will be explained, of 
universal jurisdiction and oil pollution is covered by a specific regime in 
UNCLOS which deals with protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, while human trafficking can be seen to be connected to the 
well-established regime concerning slavery. Through these crimes, a broad 
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cover of legal regimes in various maritime zones will be illustrated and with 
them, a state’s possibility to take action against crimes of various natures, 
not only these three crimes, but all crimes with a similar nature and legal 
structure. 
In its finality, it is discussed whether it can be concluded that there might 
even exist, in international law, an obligation on the coastal state to take 
these measures against the delinquent vessel, even if the flag state does not 
agree, or remains silent regarding the proposed actions. 
 
1.1 Method and Material 
 
This thesis has its methodological foundation in the dogmatic discipline 
which implies that the research is based on a study of de lege lata. In this 
case de lege lata is mainly covered by international conventions although 
national laws will be mentioned for the enlightenment of how a legal 
problem is either solved or founded through the implementation of 
international law in a national legal system. The relevant international law is 
analysed with the help of legal doctrine, national law, and to some extent 
case law as sources of law. Chapter 3.2 concerning human trafficking
2
 will 
also include a short element of discussion on de lege ferenda with the 
discussion whether a provision in UNCLOS concerning slavery can be used 
mutatis mutandis for the transport of people subject to trafficking. However, 
except for that passage, the discussions will primarily deal with the 
interpretation and study of existing international law, both through 
conventions and agreements as well as customary international law. 
 The thesis includes two comparative elements; first, for the study of how a 
coastal state may act depending on where the vessel can be found, the 
enforcement possibilities of the nominated crimes will be compared 
depending on the different maritime zones,. The second comparison follows 
from the first and involves a comparative analysis of the coastal state’s 
jurisdiction in comparison with flag state jurisdiction in the various 
maritime zones, in relation to these crimes.  
The foundation of this thesis lies in the provisions in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS). With those provisions, 
which in many cases can be said to constitute customary international law, 
as a starting point, various other conventions are used that either provide 
illustrative examples or elaborate further and give details of the matter 
discussed. It is important that the conclusions drawn from the conventions 
are founded in legal doctrine, and for this reason books and articles are used. 
These sources also provide valuable insight and background to the topics of 
discussion.  
                                               
2 In this thesis the terms “trafficking” and “human trafficking” are used interchangeably to 
mean the same thing. 
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The first three chapters are mainly of a descriptive nature with some 
analytical elements, and it is primarily chapter 5 that is of true analytical 
value where elements from the previous chapters are brought together.  
 
1.2. Delimitation and Disposition 
 
In international law, warships and governmental vessels enjoy almost 
complete immunity as a consequence of state sovereignty. The result is that 
there almost always exists an exception for warships and other 
governmental vessels in various conventions and international agreements.
3
 
UNCLOS deals with a warship’s responsibilities in foreign territorial seas in 
articles 29-32 and these articles simply state that the governmental vessel in 
question needs to comply with the coastal state’s rules and that the flag state 
carry the international responsibility for its vessels if non-compliance would 
result in damage to the coastal state. For other parts of the convention, 
governmental vessels are simply excluded although the flag state must 
ensure, as far as possible, compliance with the convention by these vessels.
4
   
The thesis does not discuss the special legal regime concerning archipelagic 
states. These states enjoy the same rights and obligations as other states and 
the right of innocent passage exists in archipelagic waters as well.
5
 The 
major difference is the drawing of baselines and the classification of the 
waters. For the sake of simplicity, these states and their maritime zones will 
be assimilated to states having a “normal” coastline. 
All areas of subject outside the very narrow scope of this essay, e.g. state 
conduct when exercising its right of jurisdiction and its compliance with 
human rights, will be disregarded without any mention in the text. This does 
not mean that this author considers these subjects unimportant in any way, 
on the contrary it is a very important aspect of enforcement jurisdictions, but 
for a thesis this size it is unfortunately impossible to include everything of 
interest and importance. 
As an introduction, a short exposition of different forms of jurisdictions that 
is of importance to later chapters is provided, and this is followed by a short 
introduction to the crimes on which this thesis will focus. Neither the 
jurisdictions nor the crimes are examined in detail, but an overview is 
provided so that the substance of the sequent discussion is comprehensible. 
Before the analysis on how a coastal state may manage these offences, a 
synopsis of prevailing jurisdictions in the maritime zones is presented in 
chapter 4. The main discussion that embodies the topic, i.e. what recourses a 
coastal state may have against a delinquent vessel in various maritime 
zones, is found in chapter 5 which is followed by a conclusion that 
summarizes the essence of this thesis.   
                                               
3 See the SUA convention, article 2; and the BWM convention article 3(2)(e). 
4 UNCLOS article 95 and 236. 
5 Ibid., article 52. 
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2. Introduction to jurisdictions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The Oxford dictionary has defined the word “jurisdiction” as ”the official 
power to make legal decisions and judgements”6. In national law, this refers 
primarily to a court’s authority to try a certain case, both concerning the 
parties and the subject matter. In international law, this relates to the same 
issues, but at a higher level; does a state have the right to legislate and/or 
enforce those laws and try the case in question? Is the suspected offender 
subject to that state’s authority? 
There is a need to distinguish between legislative jurisdiction
7
, i.e. the right 
of states to make laws, and enforcement jurisdiction, a state’s right to 
enforce its laws. Legislative jurisdiction can be based either on ratione 
personae
8
, ratione loci
9
 or ratione material
10
, while enforcement 
jurisdiction is primarily based on ratione loci, i.e. on geographical scope. A 
state cannot send agents to enforce its laws within the territory of another 
state without the consent of that state, while on the high seas, where no 
forms of territorial jurisdiction prevail, a state may exercise enforcement 
jurisdiction based on nationality.
11
 This thesis is primarily dealing with 
maritime law, and the discussion is never whether a state can enforce its 
own national laws in the maritime zones of another state, but what measures 
of enforcement a state may take against a delinquent vessel and its crew 
within its own maritime zones or the high seas, where it has already 
exercised its legislative jurisdiction. Legislative jurisdiction will only be 
mentioned in circumstances where this is of importance, in all other cases 
the term “jurisdiction” will refer to enforcement jurisdiction. 
The importance of the sequent types of jurisdiction in international law 
varies depending on legal traditions in different states, and even though it is 
the opinion of leading scholars, including dr. Luc Reydams, that only the 
principles of territoriality, flag state, active personality and protection are 
                                               
6 Oxford Dictionary, online resource: http://oxforddictionaries.com. 
7 This is also known as prescriptive jurisdiction. 
8 This term is referring to different classes of people, e.g. those concerned by the active or 
passive nationality principle. 
9 This term refers to geographical limits. The the most illustrative example is laws 
applicable solely within the territory of a state. They can also be more restricted e.g. laws 
concerning environmental protection of a certain forest or fishing restrictions within the 
territorial sea. See the Swedish Environmental code (Miljöbalk 1998:808) chapter 4, for 
examples of laws concerning these distinct areas of interest. 
10 This term refers to types of objects, e.g. personal property in comparison to immovable 
property. See Swedish Land and Cadastral Legislation (Jordabalk 1970:994)   
11 Shaw, Malcolm, International Law. 6th ed.  Cambridge University Press 2008, pp. 645-
646. 
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uncontested
12
, a few more that are used or encouraged will be introduced 
below. 
 
2.2 Territorial jurisdiction 
 
This most basic form of jurisdiction has its foundation in the conception of a 
state’s sovereignty over its own land. The jurisdiction arises by the sole fact 
that the offence took place within the territory of the state and it does not 
matter to which state the offender is a national or where he or she resides. 
This notion that the forum state should have competence for those crimes 
committed on its territory is uncontested and used everywhere.
13
 However, 
this does not entail that no legal issues might arise from this principle. One 
of the most discussed issues is where the offence can be considered as 
having taken place. This is not always easy to conclude considering that an 
offence might have consequences in other places than where the offence 
was originally committed, and those states might want to claim jurisdiction 
based on the fact that the offence’s consequences took place on their 
territory.  
An illustrative example is a typical oil pollution incident. The act, either 
accidental or voluntary, that caused the leakage might have taken place in 
one jurisdiction while the actual leakage took place in a second and many 
others might get affected by the drifting oil. It is hard to determine exactly 
what should constitute the act in itself here: the damage to the vessel, the 
leakage of oil or the damage to the state? The doctrine of ubiquity
14
 is used 
in many states to clarify this issue, and it denotes that the offence may be 
regarded as taking place in whole, where only part of it took place in reality. 
What a state require for claiming jurisdiction based on territoriality differs, 
some states requires that the act constituting the offence has taken place 
within its jurisdiction, while others find that it is essential for the creation of 
jurisdiction that the consequences of the act took place within its 
jurisdiction. This means that an act that takes place in one state but render 
consequences in another state can result in two states have jurisdiction based 
on territoriality.
15
 The answer to the issue above concerning oil pollution is 
that, depending on what the state requires for jurisdiction, all states involved 
might claim territorial jurisdiction as long as it is criminalized in national 
law. 
                                               
12 Reydams, Luc, Universal jurisdiction: international and municipal legal perspectives. 
Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 22. 
13 European Committee on Crime Problems, p. 8; Shearer, I,A., Starke’s International Law. 
11th ed.  Butterworths, 1994., p. 184. 
14 This is also known as the objective territorial principle. See Brownlie, Ian., Principles of 
Public International Law. 7th ed, Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 301. 
15 Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, European Committee on Crime Problems, 
Strasbourg 1990, pp. 8-9. 
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For a state to provide itself with jurisdiction for offences taking place in 
another state but that was completed or brought along severe effects in the 
state in question, there also exists, apart from the doctrine of ubiquity, the 
objective territorial principle. It merely concerns this one half of the 
ubiquity principle, and it was this principle that was used in the Lotus case
16
 
that now has reached UNCLOS
17
.  
In the modern world of today, a lot of communication and transactions take 
place electronically over the internet and it is not always easy to establish 
where the actual crime took place. The same offence might travel through 
servers in various countries and have effects in many different jurisdictions 
and in this case the doctrine of ubiquity does not help since the core issue in 
that context is to determine where the offence took place, i.e. what 
jurisdictions that might be relevant as a starting point. This discussion, 
though being very interesting, is outside the scope of this thesis that focuses 
on maritime, and not cyber-space oriented questions. 
The principle of territorial jurisdiction is a very fundamental principle 
concerning state sovereignty, but still it has proved to be not completely 
exclusive. As will be discussed below, there exist other principles of 
jurisdiction providing states, other than the forum state, with jurisdiction 
over offences concerning its nationals or a certain type of crime.  
 
2.2.1 Flag State Jurisdiction 
 
Ships have displayed flags and other symbols since the Vikings ruled the 
north and it has been a symbol of inherence, either to a port, district, tribe or 
state, since the middle ages. It was important already in the early days to be 
able to show where the vessel belonged so that it would not be considered a 
pirate ship or a vessel belonging to the enemy and thus free to take as 
prize.
18
 
There is little debate over the legality of flag state jurisdiction, but much 
more about the classification of the jurisdiction. Some argue that flag state 
jurisdiction is based on the principle of nationality, i.e. that the vessel has 
the nationality of the flag state according to UNCLOS
19
, and thus is 
protected by that state as its national. Others argue that a vessel is a 
“floating island” of the state and that it should be regarded as the territory of 
the flag state.
20
 This notion of the floating island regime has its foundation 
                                               
16 See part 2.2.1.1. 
17 Article 27(1)(a) ” if the consequences of the crime extends to the coastal state”. The 
Lotus case took place in an area that at the time was considered as the high seas, but that 
today would be regarded as the territorial sea.  
18 Mansell, John N.K., Flag State Responsibility, Historical Development and 
Contemporary Issues. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, p. 14. 
19 UNCLOS article 91. 
20 Molenaar, E.J., Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution.  Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, p. 83. 
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already in the writings of Jeremy Bentham
21
, and it is still a topic of 
discussion. M. Nyholm said in his dissenting opinion in the Lotus case that 
the Turkish vessel was a floating extension of Turkish territory according to 
international law.
22
 This doctrine has been criticized in English law
23
 and it 
has been concluded that this is solely a metaphor meaning that the flag state 
has jurisdiction over the vessel in the same way as it has over its territory.
24
 
The floating island doctrine is not to be taken literally with the result that it 
would provide a territorial sea around the vessel or similar absurd 
consequences.  
No matter how it is characterized, the importance of the flag state 
jurisdiction is today greater than it has ever been. In the old days, the 
majority of the vessels did not travel far from land and they did not bring 
about very many people on board with the result that most vessels were 
subject to coastal state jurisdiction.  If something went wrong when the 
vessel was far from shore, there were not many people affected by the 
possible lack of jurisdiction. Today, the ship business is gigantic, and the 
same goes for the vessels that can house close to 6000 people
25
. Imagine the 
possible legal problems if a vessel of this size would be free from 
jurisdiction on the high seas and possibly even worse, if it were to be faced 
with exclusive coastal state’s jurisdiction in every state’s waters that the 
vessel passes through. This would lead to a situation where either no laws or 
too many different laws and regulations would be applicable for the small 
community on board.  
It is an obligation of each state through its national laws to regulate the 
requirements for how a vessel acquires this right to fly the flag of that 
state.
26
 When a vessel has received the permission to carry its flag, it has 
acquired the nationality of that state, and is thus subject to its jurisdiction 
like any other national.
27
 Unlike individuals, who can have dual citizenship, 
a vessel  is not allowed to fly more than one flag
28
, if this is done, the vessel 
is regarded as a vessel without nationality
29
 with the result that the vessel 
has no protection at all in international law.
30
 The flag state has an 
obligation to “effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters”31 and it is stated in various 
                                               
21 Coles, Richard M.F; Watt, Edward B., Ship Registration: Law and Practice, para. 1.22. 
22 The Lotus para. 217. 
23 Chung Chi Cheung v REX. (1938) 62 Ll.L.Rep. 151. That this is still valid is shown in 
Saldanha v. Fulton Navigation Inc. (the Omega King) [2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 206 
24 Shearer, p. 246. 
25 Royal Caribbean International’s Allure of the Seas has 18 decks and can take 5400 
guests, crew not included. http://www.royalcaribbean.se/kryssningsfartyg/oasis-of-the-
seas/allure-of-the-seas.htm.  
26 UNCLOS article 91. 
27 See active personality principle below in part 2.3. 
28 An exception to this rule is found in UNCLOS article 93 for vessels flying the flag of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies.   
29 UNCLOS article 92(2). 
30 Coles and Watt, para. 1.2.  
31 UNCLOS article 94.  
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parts of UNCLOS what responsibilities the flag state has towards the 
international community.
32
 
As a general rule, the flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over its vessels, 
but, as will be discussed in later chapters, this has been heavily restricted in 
international law for the benefit of e.g. coastal states. Not even on the high 
seas, which is not subject to any state sovereignty
33
, the flag state has 
complete exclusive jurisdiction. How this is restricted will be discussed in 
chapter 4. 
 
 2.2.1.1 Lotus  
 
In 1926, a collision between a French and a Turkish steamer took place on 
the high seas which resulted in the death of eight Turkish citizens. The 
collision took place between five and six nautical miles off the Turkish 
shore, an area that today would be considered as territorial sea, but at that 
time in history was considered as the high seas.  
When the Lotus arrived in Turkey, the Turkish authorities initiated 
investigations and proceedings against the French commander who was 
found guilty according to Turkish law in a Turkish court. The dispute that 
arose between France and Turkey was that of jurisdiction; whether Turkey 
acted according to international law when exercising its criminal 
jurisdiction. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), found that, unless 
provided for in an international agreement or by international customary 
law, jurisdiction is based on principles of territory and a state may not 
exercise its jurisdiction outside its own territory.
34
 According to the court, a 
vessel is seen as a part of the flag state’s territory and thus offences taking 
place on a vessel sailing the high seas is thus regarded as taking place in the 
territory of the flag state. This would lead to the conclusion that the flag 
state has exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas, but the court continued by 
stating that it also follows that if the offence has effects that stretches to the 
other vessel; this is seen as having effects on the territory of the other 
vessel’s flag state which would provide the other state with concurrent 
jurisdiction.
35
 In this case, the conclusion was that the flag state of the 
“vigilante vessel”, i.e. France, did not have exclusive jurisdiction on the 
high seas and thus both France and Turkey had concurrent jurisdiction.  
The court found that Turkey was not in violation of international law since it 
was concluded that the state had jurisdiction and that there was no 
international rule prohibiting its exercise of criminal jurisdiction.
36
 Though, 
                                               
32 See article 42(5), 94 and 218. 
33 UNCLOS article 89 and 92(1). 
34 The Lotus para. 45. 
35 Ibid, para. 65. 
36 Ibid, para. 90. 
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the court was far from unanimous in its decision and it was only after the 
President’s casting vote that the judgment was settled. The judgment 
contains six dissenting opinions and the response to the judgment has not 
been very positive. Mr. Loder, a former president of PCIJ, wrote in his 
dissenting opinion that criminal jurisdiction of a state cannot extend to 
offences committed by a foreigner in foreign territory without violating the 
sovereignty of that state. 
 
2.2.1.2 Flags of Convenience 
 
In 2012, Panama had 3,6 million inhabitants.
37
 The same year, as many 
years before, Panama had the largest registered fleet in the world. 21,39 % 
of the world fleet was registered in this state and  99,97% of  these were 
owned by non-Panamanian citizens.
38
 An old term that is still used, is the so 
called Flag of Convenience (FOC) registry, a term to which Panama 
belongs. The International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), has defined 
a FOC registry as “[w]here beneficial ownership and control of a vessel is 
found to lie elsewhere than in the country of the flag the vessel is flying, the 
vessel is considered as sailing under a flag of convenience.”39 In FOC 
registries non-nationals can register their vessels to avoid high taxes, tough 
labour laws concerning the crew or high, and costly safety standards higher 
than international minimum requirement. This is possible due to low state 
control and a lax attitude of the flag state concerning shipping policies. This 
might have the consequence that the owners of the vessels do not have to 
keep their vessels at the same high standard as required by national 
registries which in turn may result in sub-standard vessels that are a safety 
risk for the maritime community. There is no doubt that even national 
registries can have sub-standard vessels, but the likelihood that they will 
remain undetected and cause incidents at sea is proven bigger in the FOC 
registries.
40
  
Over time, the registry system has changed. Before, there were only two 
types of registries, the traditional, and the FOC. Today, there are in addition 
hybrid systems, shipbuilding registries and bareboat charter registries. The 
terms FOC and “traditional” registries have as a result changed to “open” 
and “closed” registries referring to whether or not they allow non-nationals 
as owners of the vessels. However, it is not easy to label the registries when 
considering that some registries have the status of hybrids, i.e. they are open 
to all nationalities in comparison to the closed registries which often only 
accept nationals as owners of the vessel. The hybrids have instead lowered 
                                               
37 Swedish encyclopedia (nationalencyklopedin). Online resource: 
http://www.ne.se/lang/panama/279226.  
38 Review of Maritime Transport 2012. Report by the UNCTAD secretariat, p. 44. For 
further information about the Panamanian registry, see Mansell, chapter 7.3.  
39 ITF website http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm.  
40 Churchill, R.R; Lowe, A.V., The Law of the Sea. 3rd ed, Manchester University Press, 
1999.pp. 258-262;  Mansell, chapter 7.3.  
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some of the high demands that normally come with a closed registry, e.g. 
requirement of a crew consisting of nationals only.
41
  
In UNCLOS a requirement of a genuine link between the vessel and the flag 
state can be found
42
, but exactly what this entails is under constant debate. 
The convention states that it is up to each state to decide how a vessel 
acquires nationality and that the only requirement in the convention is that 
there exists this genuine link between the state and the vessel. The 
convention does not mention the nationality of the owner anywhere; this is 
something that states themselves have included as a link between the state 
and the vessel. States have no right to object to another state’s conditions for 
granting of flag
43
, the disapproving state might have laws contrary to its 
own, that might require other elements for the fulfilment of genuine link, 
but due to state sovereignty, the state still cannot challenge the rules unless 
they are contrary to international law.
44
  
In states where the genuine link is based on the nationality of the shipowner, 
a way around this “problem” which has proven quite successful is the 
“corporate veil” which means that the true ownership of the vessel is hidden 
behind a more or less complicated corporate structure. Courts around the 
world have found themselves unwilling to lift this corporate veil for the sake 
of revealing who is de facto owning and controlling the vessel. This was the 
case in Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen
45
 where the vessel Onkel Sam was 
registered in Panama and owned by a Panamanian company that in fact was 
completely owned by a sole Danish citizen. The result was that the genuine 
link could be considered satisfied when the vessel was owned by a company 
registered in that state, even though it only existed for the sake of fulfilling 
the requirement of genuine link according to the registry state’s national 
laws.  
Enforcement jurisdiction is contextually relevant to this enquiry. An FOC, 
or an “open” registry, which has more or less the primary purpose of 
earning money to the state, does not exactly exhaust itself in taking 
measures for the prevention and punishment of crimes committed on or by 
their vessels. But, as mentioned above, to exercise jurisdiction and control 
over master, officers and crew, is an international duty of the flag state. 
Also, if an offence has occurred, the flag state is required by international 
law to investigate and if necessary, to institute proceedings against the 
alleged offender.
46
 If this is not done, it may constitute a violation of 
international law for which the state may be held responsible according to 
the doctrine of state responsibility.
47
 But, for proceedings to be taken against 
                                               
41 NIS Website: http://www.sjofartsdir.no/en/vessels/registration-of-vessel/norwegian-
international-ship-register-nis/.  
42 UNCLOS article 91. 
43 The M/V ”Saiga” (No. 2) case. (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) The 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 1999., para. 80-86.  
44 Churchill and Lowe, pp. 260-262. 
45 C-286/90. 
46 UNCLOS article 94(2)(b) and 217(4). 
47 See Case concerning the difference between New Zealand and France concerning the 
interpretation or application of two agreements concluded on 9 July 1986 between the two 
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the FOC/open registry that has violated international law, there needs to be a 
state which has the right, interest and possibility to litigate against this state. 
This is not something that is done easily over a day, but a complicated thing 
that both takes time and costs money. Some international organizations have 
studied this and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) has written guidelines on how and what actions that can be 
taken towards a state, not necessarily a FOC state, that does not fulfil its flag 
state duties. These actions include trade measures against the delinquent 
state, diplomatic interventions as well as legal proceedings.
48
  
The FOC has been a topic of debate for more than 60 years
49
, and still the 
international community has not been able to solve this problem 
satisfactorily.
50
  
 
2.3 Nationality 
 
In the same way that a state has jurisdiction over its territory based on the 
notion of state sovereignty, a state may have jurisdiction over its nationals. 
This is shown through two different principles, the passive and active 
nationality principle. The active nationality principle is sometimes referred 
to only as the nationality principle and it concerns the situation when a state 
requires jurisdiction over a crime that a national of that state is suspected of, 
or proven to be the offender of, even though it is committed outside the 
territory of that state.  
This might at first sight seem as a very clear principle that does not render 
much discussion. However, in a world where people have dual citizenship 
and frequently relocate, questions may arise. One can ponder the thought of 
a person who is a national of state A, commits a crime in state B which is a 
state where this person was born and has lived in all her life but has not 
acquired citizenship. Does state A still have jurisdiction? Does the answer 
change if this person has dual citizenship in both state A and state B? 
Especially the issue of dual citizenship has become more frequent in many 
states
51
 and for this reason many states, especially common law states, only 
                                                                                                                       
States and that related to the problems arising from the Rainbow Warrior affair. See 
UNRIAA, vol. XX, pp. 215-284, “any violation by a State of any obligation, of whatever 
origin, gives rise to State responsibility and consequently, to the duty of reparation.”  Para 
75. 
48 Expert Workshop on Flag State Responsibilities: Assessing Performance and Taking 
Action, 25 – 28 March 2008, Vancouver, Canada. Guidance Document May 2009, pp. 13-
14. 
49 The ITF started its campaign against Flags of Convenience in 1948. See Mansell, chapter 
7.2.  
50 The Lotus, para. 108. 
51 See the Swedish Nationality Act (Lag (2001:82) om svenskt medborgarskap) and the 
Swedish Government Webpage: http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/6998/a/84070.  
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use this type of jurisdiction for very serious offences where the state for 
some reason considers it necessary to handle the prosecution itself.
52
 
A related principle that is used even less is the passive personality principle. 
It concerns situations where the victim of an offence is a national of a state 
that wishes to exercise jurisdiction. In the Lotus, this principle was 
disregarded and the court said that this principle could only be used when it 
was the only basis for criminal jurisdiction.
53
 The view has changed over 
time and today states are encouraged in various conventions to broaden the 
jurisdiction in their national laws to include the passive personality 
principle.
54
  
 
2.4 Universal Jurisdiction 
 
The principle of universal jurisdiction provides any state with jurisdiction 
for certain serious offences committed by non-nationals. The requirements 
are that the crime is considered as delict jure gentium and its repression is 
encouraged and even demanded in international law for the assurance that 
the crime does not go unpunished. There exists no requirement of a link 
between the state and the offender such as those found in the active and 
passive personality principle, and the jurisdiction is almost completely 
irrespective of where the offence took place or where the consequences 
occurred. 
 The traditional offences provided with universal jurisdiction are those of 
piracy, crimes against humanity and various war crimes, and it becomes 
more frequent in international agreements to provide member states with 
universal jurisdiction amongst themselves. An example of this is the UN 
Torture Convention
55
 where each state has to provide national legislation for 
the criminalization of torture for crimes not only committed within state 
territory, but also for both the active and passive personality principle for 
crimes committed outside that state’s territory, if this is allowed in national 
law
56
. Even though the scope of the subjects of the convention is very 
extensive, it is not a true universal jurisdiction that is created since states 
have to be party to the convention for this to be applicable. If a situation 
arises that does not concern any state party under the jurisdictions 
mentioned, the convention does not provide states with authority to act, this 
in comparison to true universal jurisdiction where all states always have 
right to take action. This type of constructive universal jurisdiction has been 
named “quasi-universal”57 and can be summarized as an obligation to 
                                               
52 Brownlie, p. 304; Shaw, pp. 661-663. 
53 Lotus, para. 60. 
54 Shaw, pp. 664-666; see also the SUA Convention article 6. 
55 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 10 December 1984. 
56 The UN Torture Convention article 4-5. 
57 Shaw, p. 674. 
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provide territorial and national jurisdiction for certain specified 
extraterritorial offences.  
The Institut de Droit International (IDI) writes that for a state to be able to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over a certain person, this person needs to be 
within the territory of the forum state. That state should also before 
initiating proceedings, ask the state in which the crime was committed, as 
well as the state where the suspected criminal is a national whether they are 
willing to exercise their jurisdiction,
58
 in other words should the universal 
jurisdiction, according to the IDI, give way for states which have 
jurisdiction based on territory or nationality. Before the Eichmann 
incident
59
, the controversial doctrine male captus bene detentus was used 
and it was commonly regarded that if a person was abducted from one state 
for prosecution in another state, it was the sovereignty of the first state that 
was violated with the effect that only that state could complain. Even though 
some states, e.g. the United States, still abide by this doctrine, more courts 
today put emphasis on the human rights of the offender which, today, does 
not allow a person to be unwillingly abducted from a country. The result is 
that more states find themselves unwilling to try a case where the suspected 
offender has not come into the territory of the forum state by extradition or 
free will.
60
  
The list of crimes that fall under the universal jurisdiction is very short and 
hard to change. But there are many crimes that even though they do not fall 
under universal jurisdiction are of such a nature that “normal” jurisdiction is 
not allowed. The importance of them getting punished is of such urgency 
that it is of less importance which state is the prosecuting state, i.e. the need 
for justice actually overrules state sovereignty. This is the basis of the 
maxim Aut dedere aut judicare that has been used since 1625 when Hugo 
Grotius wrote about it in his book De iure belli ad pacis.
61
The maxim 
means that there exists an international obligation for a state which houses a 
person who is suspected of having committed a serious international crime 
to prosecute this person, if no other states have demanded extradition. This 
maxim exists to make sure that certain crimes do not go unpunished, even 
though they do not fall under the universal jurisdiction. Even though some 
argue for the maxim’s status as jus cogens it is generally regarded as a 
                                               
58 Institut de Droit International, Resolution from its seventeenth commission, Universal 
criminal jurisdiction with regard to the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. See also Shaw, pp. 672-673. 
59 Alfred Eichmann was, after the second world war, charged with “crimes against the 
Jewish people” and “crimes against humanity” in Israel, and he was hiding under a false 
name in Argentina. For the Israeli court to be able to try his case, he needed to physically 
be in Israel, and, even though it is not officially known how the transfer took place, 
Eichmann was moved without his or Argentina’s’ consent to Israel. See Baade, Hans W., 
“The Eichmann Trail: Some Legal Aspects”. Duke Law Journal 1961:400, on further 
information about the legality of Eichmann’s trial in Israel. 
60 Eichmann Supreme Court Judgment, 50 years on, its significance today. Amnesty 
International Publications, p. 17-19. 
61 Plachta, Michael, “Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: An Overview of Modes of Implementation 
and Approaches”. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 6, Issue 4 
(1999), pp. 331-365., p. 331. 
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general principle of international law and thus something states can choose 
to adhere to if they so wish,
62
 and it is encompassed in various conventions, 
one being the SUA convention.
63
 
 
2.5 Customary law 
 
In article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) it 
is expressed that the court shall apply  “international custom, as evidence of 
a general practice accepted as law”. The traditional requirements for a rule 
of law to be regarded as international customary law are first that there is 
general and consistent practice of the relevant rule by states. This does not 
mean that the rule has to be universally used, especially considering that 
some states might not have any use for such rules at all, e.g. landlocked 
states have little use for rules in maritime law concerning coastal areas. 
Neither does the rule have to have been consistent for a long period of time; 
some practice springs up quite suddenly but can none the less be considered 
as customary law, e.g. the regime of the continental shelf. But, the longer 
and more widespread the use of the rule of law is, the more it speaks for its 
status as customary law.  The second requirement is the existence of opinio 
juris, the existence of an international consensus of the requirement of the 
rule in question, and that the opinion on the international plane thus speaks 
for an approval of the rule; in other words, the international community has 
acknowledged the rule as important as well as in line with international 
law.
64
 
A professor of international law, Ian Brownlie, writes that sources giving 
evidence of international custom in each relevant case include: diplomatic 
correspondence, policy statements, press releases, legal advisor’s opinions, 
official manuals on legal questions, comments by governments on drafts 
produced by the International Law Commission, national laws, both 
international as well as national court decisions, recitals in treaties and other 
international instruments, practice of international organs and resolutions 
regarding legal questions from the United Nations General Assembly. Not 
all of these sources carry the same influence and not all of them might be 
needed in every given case, but the more evidence of uniform practice in 
these sources, the stronger is the likelihood that the practice can be 
considered as customary law. 
65
 
The effect of a rule being considered as customary law is that all states are 
bound by it, not depending on a convention or international agreement. A 
                                               
62 Plachta,  p 333. 
63 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, see article 7 and 10. 
64 Brownlie pp. 7-9; and Churchill and Lowe, p.7. 
65 Ibid p. 6. 
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state may be exempted from this if it has objected to the rule of law even 
before it was considered as customary law and has stuck to its opinion.
66
  
Even though it might sound contradictious, a convention that is said to 
codify customary law has member states. Those states are bound by the 
wording of the customary law and the rules can thus be interpreted 
according to the words and context of the convention. However, states that 
are not part of the said convention are still bound by the customary law, 
although not necessarily the exact wording of the codifying convention. It is 
much harder to interpret a rule of law that is not in writing, but the codifying 
convention may be used as a source of international custom as mentioned 
above. Theoretically, the state will not be bound by the text of the 
convention but the core of the customary law.  
 
2.5.1 Customary Law in the Maritime Context 
 
For more than 50 years the International Law Commission (ILC)
67
 has 
worked with the codification of public international law through various 
draft conventions. At its first session in 1949, the commission agreed on 25 
topics to study further. These included the regime of the high seas and the 
territorial seas. In the beginning they were regarded as two separate topics 
but at the eighth session in 1956 they were bundled together under the topic 
of “the Law of the Sea”. The United Nations General Assembly decided to 
convene at an international conference to examine this topic further. The 
conference took place in Geneva in 1958 and it was decided that the draft 
articles, some slightly amended, were to be embodied in four separate 
conventions; the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone; the Convention on the High Seas; the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas; and the Convention 
on the Continental Shelf. Many of the articles found in these conventions 
were later the foundation, and some even copied word by word, of the 
correspondent articles today found in UNCLOS.
68
  
It can be assumed that at least those articles that correspond to the ILC’s 
draft articles, constitute customary international law. Churchill and Lowe 
write in their textbook the Law of the Sea, that the right of intervention 
against threats of pollution on the high seas might be considered as 
customary international law, even though this was not a part of the 
Convention on the High Seas. The authors argue that when the British 
government decided to take action and bomb the Torrey Canyon, this can be 
considered the birth of that particular customary rule. That the rule was not 
already considered as customary law at that time, Churchill and Lowe 
explain by the fact that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
                                               
66 (United Kingdom v. Norway) 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116. 
67 Which has as its object the codification and development of international law, see article 
1 of the Statute of the International Law Commission.  
68 International Law Commission’s Website: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/8_2.htm.  
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found it necessary to draft the Intervention Convention that provides states 
with this right of intervention.
69
 Today, the right of states to take action on 
the high seas is found in article 221 UNCLOS, whose first paragraph is a 
paraphrasing of the Intervention convention’s first article, and the second 
paragraph in article 221 which contains a definition of “maritime casualty”, 
is almost identical to the corresponding article in the Intervention 
Convention.
70
 This is just one example of rules in UNCLOS that, after the 
ILC’s draft articles were completed over 50 years ago, have evolved into 
customary law. 
The preamble of UNCLOS reads that this convention contains codification 
and progressive development of the law of the sea. But, this does not mean 
that the whole convention can be considered as customary international law. 
UNCLOS had as of 2013-01-23 165 member states, with Timor-Leste as the 
newest member from 2013-01-08.
71
 The UN has 193 member states and the 
only internationally recognized independent state in the world that is not 
part of the UN, is the Vatican.
72
 This means that 85% of the recognized 
states in the world are parties to UNCLOS. The convention was signed in 
1982 and entered into force in November 1994 when the 60
th
 instrument of 
ratification or accession was deposited
73
. This demonstrates that the 
convention has been recognized as international law by more than 60 states 
for over 18 years. This raises the question whether it can be said that the 
criteria of general and consistent practice and the existence of opinion juris 
have been met, with the result that is has been transformed into rules of 
customary law.  
The UN and its agencies have a tendency to treat UNCLOS as customary 
law by giving it priority over other conventions even though not all parties 
to that other convention are parties to UNCLOS, and sometimes the 
conventions even refer to UNCLOS as customary law.
74
 Resolution 40/63 
the General Assembly has recognized that “all related activities within the 
United Nations system need to be implemented in a manner consistent with 
it”75, with “it” being UNCLOS. This all speaks in favour of UNCLOS 
constituting customary international law, but the UN Division for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea writes about the universal participation of 
                                               
69 Churchill and Lowe, pp.354-355. 
70 Article 2.1.  
71 United Nations Oceans and the Law of the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law 
of the Sea’s Webpage: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm.  
72 UN Swedish Educational Website: http://www.fn.se/fn-info/om-fn/fns-medlemslander/.  
73 United Nations Oceans and the Law of the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law 
of the Sea’s Webpage: 
http//www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm
.  
74 See the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on 
Ships, 2001, Article 15, “Relationship to International Law of the Sea”. 
 Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the rights and obligations of 
any State under customary international law as reflected in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
75 General Assembly Resolution 40/63, 1985.   
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UNCLOS on their webpage and there it differentiates between those 
provisions that are binding only for member states, and provisions of 
customary international law, or those becoming customary international 
law.
76
 Concerning some provisions in UNCLOS, there are some deviations 
from the rules in state practice, which argue against customary law, and 
according to Churchill and Lowe, some provisions are not of 
“fundamentally norm-creating character”.77 In the convention, a linguistic 
distinction can be found regarding the use of the words “States”78 and 
“States Parties”79, but it is not clear whether any complete conclusion can be 
drawn through this distinction more than that the wording “States Parties” 
clearly speaks against that provision, at the time of its drafting, being 
regarded as customary law.
 80
 No similar conclusion can be made in reverse.  
This discussion can continue, but in this context the conclusion that 
UNCLOS not only contains customary law, but also law that is only binding 
for member states, will have to be satisfactory. The provisions that have its 
origins in the Geneva conventions are more likely to be regarded as 
customary law, but it might not be possible to make any clear conclusions 
without looking into every provision in the convention in detail. For the 
purpose of this discussion, it is most interesting to know that some 
provisions might be regarded as customary law and thus binding upon all 
states regardless of a state is party to UNCLOS or not. 
 
2.5.2 Jus Cogens 
 
The ILC has defined jus cogens as 
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character
81
 
A jus cogens crime is found at the top of the legal hierarchy triumphing over 
all other international norms and principles, including customary 
international law. Its prohibition is obligatio erga omnes, i.e. a requirement 
of all states irrespective of any treaty, and a change in, or removal of the 
norm, must be supported by opinio juris. A convention cannot be in conflict 
                                               
76 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a historical Perspective.  The UN 
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea’s webpage: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.ht
m.  
77 Churchill and Lowe, p. 162. 
78 See article 98 which refers to “every state”.  This semantically entails that it does not 
matter if the state is party to the convention or not.  
79 See article 139. 
80 Harrison, James., “Evolution of the law of the sea: developments in law-making in the 
wake of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention”. Ph.D Thesis, School of Law, University of 
Edinburgh, 2007 p. 64. 
81 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, article 53. 
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with jus cogens, and would such a norm come into existence, any previous 
conventions in conflict with the new norm would be void.
82
 The relationship 
between jus cogens and customary international law is debated amongst 
legal scholars, some of who argue that they can be considered as two sides 
of the same coin, while other scholars are of the opinion that there are 
important differences between the two.
83
  
Some crimes are of such a nature that they have obtained this special status 
in international law. Bassiouni writes that “certain crimes affect the interests 
of the world community as a whole because they threaten the peace and 
security of humankind and because they shock the conscience of 
humanity”84 and that if those criteria are met, there is a strong likelihood 
that it is a jus cogens crime. If only one of the criteria is met, it can still be 
considered as jus cogens but it is not a convincing argument for the status. 
Examples of crimes believed to be jus cogens are according to Bassiouni: 
genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; piracy; slavery and other 
similar practices; as well as torture.
85
 The ILC have in commentaries to the 
draft articles on state responsibility agreed that the prohibition of slavery 
and slave-trade, among others, have world-wide support.
86
 Any exhaustive 
list of jus cogens crimes have not been agreed upon by the international 
community as a whole
87
 and thus has to be examined in each specific case 
whether the crime in question may constitute jus cogens. 
For a crime to rise to the level of jus cogens, there first needs to be 
established an opinio juris of the crime as customary international law, the 
crime needs to be incorporated in a convention ratified by a high number of 
states, and the preamble and travaux préparatoire of such conventions must 
speak of the crimes in such a way that jus cogens can be implied. Also 
international tribunals’ findings in legal research and investigations when 
the crime’s legal status is questioned are of importance.88  
 
2.6  Ships without nationality  
 
Stateless vessels are those not registered in a flag state, or whose register is 
not recognized in international law. They will have the same legal status as 
                                               
82 Though the likelihood that this would ever happen is not great due to the fact that 
conventions reflect state’s commitments and opinions, and this together with state practice 
are important elements for the emergence of jus cogens. See also the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, 1969, article 53 and 64. 
83 Bassiouni, Cherif M., “International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes”. 59 
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84 Bassiouni (1996), p. 69. 
85 Bassiouni (1996), p. 68. 
86 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
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88 Bassiouni (1996), p. 68. 
26 
 
a vessel that sails with two flags or more which are both used 
interchangeably for convenience, as mentioned above.
89
 The legal status, or 
lack of legal status of such ships without nationality, is debated. On the high 
seas, UNCLOS has provided all states with a right of boarding and 
inspecting vessels suspected of being stateless and English and American 
courts have concluded that these vessels do not have the protection of any 
state
90
. The basis of this conclusion is that if the rights of the vessel are 
violated, no state has the right to complain on behalf of that vessel. In other 
words, this argument is not founded on what is actually legal, but if 
someone can oppose its illegality. This theory, though heavily supported by 
scholarly legal writing
91
, is not the only one.  Some argue that when a 
stateless vessel is in the maritime zones of a state, this coastal state may 
exercise jurisdiction based on territoriality since there is no other concurrent 
exclusive jurisdiction,
92
 while others argue that some additional 
international jurisdictional rule giving permission for seizure and 
prosecution of a stateless vessel is needed for it to be considered justified. 
Except for the right of visit, UNCLOS does not deal with the question of 
jurisdiction over stateless vessels explicitly and although common law 
courts have decided on their approach, this matter is not completely settled.
 
93
  The legal uncertainty might well be permanent considering the fact that 
no state can complain on the decisions of the common law courts, and no 
permissive rule of seizure can be found in international law and at the same 
time complete disregard of vessel nationality cannot be encouraged. The 
crew on a stateless vessel is still covered by other forms of jurisdiction e.g. 
nationality or universal jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
89 UNCLOS article 92(2); Churchill and Lowe, pp. 213-214. 
90 Naim Molvan v. Attorney General for Palestine (Law Reports, Appeals Cases (1948);  
United States v. Marino-Garcia 679 F.2d 1373, 1985 A.M.C. 1815; UNCLOS article 
110(1)(d). 
91 See Shaw, p. 614; Coles and Watt, para. 1.2.  
92 Churchill and Lowe, p. 214. 
93 Churchill and Lowe, p. 214; Guilfoyle, Douglas, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the 
Sea. Cambridge University Press, 2009., pp. 17-18. 
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3. Introductions to the crimes 
 
It is not possible to define in detail the relevant criminal offences, mainly 
because they are more of a collection of crimes with a similar nature than a 
specific act. As an example, “piracy” includes, as will be discussed later, 
more or less all violent acts on the high seas against a vessel or its crew that 
is executed for “private ends”94. For this reason, the existing definition of 
piracy is extremely broad and it is not the aim of this thesis to list and 
discuss all different actions. The definitions of the criminal offences below 
is thus those available in international law and it is up to the state in 
question to incorporate the crimes into its own national laws, with the result 
of inconsistency of application among states. The legal regime for the 
offences in a maritime context will be thoroughly discussed in chapter 5. 
 
3.1 Piracy 
 
Although piracy may not constitute a major problem to the majority of 
states in the world, and is something that people outside the field might 
consider as ancient, or even fictitious, piracy is still in the maritime field a 
highly sensitive topic that causes major problems each year. When 
researching the topic, it is clear that it has been thoroughly discussed in both 
media and legal literature for many years. The law of piracy is governed by 
eight articles in UNCLOS under part IX on the High Seas
95
 . It is defined as  
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or 
of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or 
aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act  
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
96
 
 
It is important to note that this is the definition of the international crime of 
piracy as codified customary international law agreed by the international 
community.
97
 States may have their own definitions of crimes similar to that 
                                               
94 UNCLOS article 101. 
95 Ibid Articles 100-107. 
96 Ibid article 101. 
97 Though, not everybody agree to this definition. See Tuerk, Helmut, “Combating 
Terrorism at Sea - The Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
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of piracy jus gentium, but that does not qualify under UNCLOS
98
. The 
national piracy crimes are thus not subject to universal jurisdiction or other 
provisions governing the crime in international law. To qualify as piracy, 
the act must according to UNCLOS’s article 101(a) take place outside the 
jurisdiction of a state. If the act took place within the territorial waters of a 
state, it would not be considered as piracy jus gentium, but it might be 
regarded as piracy according to that state’s national laws. That crime is then, 
as mentioned, not an international crime, but one which is only subject to 
the coastal state’s national laws as well as to normal principals of 
jurisdiction in the territorial sea.
99
 
The legal boundary of acts that should be able to constitute piracy is not 
unanimous among scholars. UNCLOS states that an action can only be 
piracy if the object of the action is for “private ends”100. According to Shaw, 
this means that the purpose of the action cannot be for a political reason 
while Guilfoyle writes that the words “private ends” only excludes those 
actions sanctioned or authorized by a state, i.e. political reasons would be 
included in the scope of piracy if it is done without state consent.
101
 For the 
punishment of those acts, which in fact might be the exact same act as the 
one which constitutes piracy, but which does not have the object of private 
gain, the piracy provisions of UNCLOS cannot be used mutatis mutandis.
102
 
Instead, those actions, which IMO has chosen to refer to as “crimes of 
piracy and armed robbery against ships”103, can be regarded as acts of 
terrorism at sea and for these acts a whole convention is dedicated: the 
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (SUA). Considering the importance of prevention of 
terrorism at sea, these crimes, which fall outside the scope of piracy jus 
gentium, will still be included in this discussion due to their similarities with 
piracy. 
                                                                                                                       
Navigation”. University of Miami International & Comparative Law Review, Vol. 15, Issue 
3 (Spring 2008), pp. 337-368., at  p. 341.  
98
 See Swedish Criminal Code (Brottsbalk 1962:700), chapter 13, article 5a. The requisites 
in the Swedish national crime of piracy, “kapning”, are the unlawful use of force for the 
sake of intervening in the maneuvering of the vessel. Unlike the international crime of 
piracy, the Swedish crime “kapning” can also be directed against an aircraft, buss, lorry, 
and various rail vehicles.  
99 See part 4.1. 
100 Article 101(a). 
101 Shaw, pp. 615-617; and Guilfoyle p. 42. 
102 There exist other requirements as well for an action to be considered as piracy jus 
gentium, e.g. that the offenders need to approach from another vessel and not operating 
from within the vessel as passengers or crew. See the Achille Lauro incident in Liljedahl p. 
124. 
103 See IMO Resolution A.922(22) where piracy is defined as “unlawful acts as defined in 
Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)” 
and, to fill the gap of those criminal activities that falls besides the scope of piracy jus 
gentium, armed robbery against ships is defined as  
any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or 
threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship or against 
persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over 
such offences 
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3.2 Trafficking  
 
Human trafficking is currently a growing issue with thousands of victims in 
Europe alone, mainly women and children. It involves trade in human 
beings, forced labour, and degrading treatment, actions which all constitute 
grave violations of basic human rights.
104
 The first article of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) reads “All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights”105. There is no doubt that this includes 
trafficking, but at the time of UDHR’s drafting, trafficking was not fully 
recognized and defined under international law, and thus there is no further 
mention of this crime in the declaration.
106
 But, there is a statement in article 
4 of the declaration that slavery in every form is prohibited.  
UNCLOS does not mention trafficking but includes a prohibition on the 
transport of slaves on the high seas
107
, a provision which is based on the 
Geneva conventions of 1958 and that has placed responsibility on flag states 
to prevent and punish the use of vessels flying its flag for this purpose and a 
provision giving all states the “right of visit” when a warship encounters a 
vessel suspected of being engaged in slave trade
108
. It is interesting to 
discuss whether this can be considered as trafficking, and whether it can be 
included in the concept of slavery. Also the question arises whether these 
provisions in UNCLOS can in any case be considered to be applicable 
mutatis mutandis for transport of people subjected to trafficking. 
The prohibition of slavery was one of the first human rights acknowledged 
under international law and is today considered as customary international 
law
109
. Even though slavery has in most states been prohibited for many 
decades
110
 the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that a 
minimum of twelve million people can be considered as slaves around the 
                                               
104 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and its 
Explanatory Report. Warsaw, 16.V.2005, p. 27. 
105 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 1. 
106 Gallagher, Anne T., The International Law of Human Trafficking. Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, pp. 12-17. 
107 Article 99. 
108 UNCLOS article 110(1)(b). 
109 Gallagher, pp. 178-179. 
110 The British Slavery Abolition Act came into force 1833which made slavery prohibited 
in the entire British Empire. The last Swedish slave was released 9 October 1847 on Saint-
Barthélemy, a former Swedish colony according to Motion 2012/13:K255. In the United 
States slavery was abolished in January 1865, although it took the state of Mississippi until 
February 2013 to ratify the decision properly according to the Swedish newspaper Dagens 
Nyheter, 2013-02-18. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/mississippi-forbjuder-slaveri-efter-
148-ar.  
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world today.
111
 A definition of slave trade can be found in the United 
Nations first Slavery Convention
112
   
(1) Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or 
all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised 
(2) The slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture, 
acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to 
slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to 
selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange 
of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in 
general, every act of trade or transport in slaves. 
113
  
Trafficking has its origin in the early twentieth century and is referred at that 
time to forced prostitution.
114
 The term did not have an international 
definition until the year 2000 when the Palermo Protocol
115
 which 
supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime
116
 was signed, and which today has been adopted by 154 
states
117
. The definition of trafficking in persons for the purpose of that 
protocol is  
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power 
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the 
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude 
or the removal of organs
118
 
The Palermo Protocol draws clear parallels between slavery and trafficking 
in persons, and there are more sources that give evidence to this parallel. 
The explanatory report to the Anti-Trafficking Convention
119
 refers to 
                                               
111 Crane, A., “Modern Slavery as a Management Practice: Exploring the Conditions and 
Capabilities for Human Exploitation”. Academy o/ Management Review 2013, Vol. 38. No. 
1, 49-69., p. 49. 
112 Convention on the Abolition of Slavery and the Slave Trade, signed at Geneva on 25 
September 1926. Hereinafter known as the 1926 Slavery Convention. 
113 Slavery Convention, article 1.  
114 Gallagher, p. 13. 
115   Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime. New York, 15 November 2000. 
116 The convention will hereinafter be referred to as the OCC, when the articles in the 
convention in itself, and not  those belonging to any of its protocols, are being discussed. 
117 12 February 2013, according to UN webpage 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-
a&chapter=18&lang=en.  
118 Palermo Protocol article 3(a). 
119 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and its 
Explanatory Report. Warsaw, 16.V.2005. 
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trafficking as “the modern form of the old worldwide slave trade”120. 
Bassiouni wrote in A Treatise on International Criminal Law from 1973 
about the forced use of women and children for prostitution and “other 
immoral purposes”121 as a related topic included in a discussion of slavery, 
and he referred to it as “white slavery”, as it was commonly known as at 
that time.
122
 The ILO’s Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention123, article 
3(a) defines “worst form of child labour” as “all forms of slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children…”. 
This provides that trafficking of children would be included under the 
notion of slavery as a wider concept, but Gallagher, an Australian barrister 
and highly renowned expert in the field of human rights, writes that it might 
be the other way around, since trafficking according to the Palermo Protocol 
shall include elements where “slavery or practices similar to slavery”124 is 
one example. This gives the impression that slavery is one entity that 
together with others may constitute trafficking.
125
 Even though trafficking 
today has been included in the definition of enslavement in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
126
, Gallagher writes that 
the legal situation today is unclear whether trafficking can be included under 
slavery, but, that if the most important aspect of slavery which involves the 
ownership of the slave, is current in the specific situation, then trafficking 
might well fall under the notion of slavery. If this includes the customary 
law of slavery is also uncertain since the customary rule is strictly attached 
to the common understanding of the notion of slavery and it is not 
something that changes very easily. On the other hand, there is evidence of 
on-going changes in the customary law of slavery since the whole 
understanding of the provision is changing, but what those changes may 
result in is yet to be seen. 
127
 
No matter how it is characterized, if slavery is part of trafficking or the other 
way around, there is no denying that the two are closely interrelated. For the 
provisions in UNCLOS to be applicable mutatis mutandis, it might not have 
to be ascertained exactly how the two crimes are connected but more that 
they are connected in such a way for those specific provisions in UNCLOS 
to be applicable. It might even be that when the persons are transported over 
the high seas, which is the core of the UNCLOS provisions, it might not yet 
be fully possible to determine whether the victims on board will be subject 
to slavery or trafficking, or something in between. The faith of those 
                                               
120 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and its 
Explanatory Report. Warsaw, 16.V.2005, p. 27. 
121 Bassiouni, Cherif M; Nanda, Ved P, A Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol I, 
Crimes and Punishment. Charles C Thomas Publisher, 1973, p. 518. 
122 Bassiouni (1973), p. 518. 
123 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, C182. 
124 Palermo Protocol article 3(a). 
125 Gallagher, p. 190.    
126 Article 7(2)(c), adopted  17-07-98,  reads: 
 "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such 
power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children. 
127 Gallagher, pp. 190-191. 
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persons is yet to be decided and the backbone of the provisions is to prohibit 
the transport of people subject to that kind of degrading treatment in the 
future.  
When it comes to dealing with trafficking as connected with slavery and 
slave-trade for the sake of applying the 1926 and the 1956 slavery 
conventions mutatis mutandis, the situation becomes a bit more 
complicated. These provisions do not only deal with the transport of slaves, 
but with slavery in its entirety, including the criminalisation of slavery in 
itself, something that is not directly applicable at sea. These conventions 
will only be brought into the discussion concerning the transport of slaves, 
provisions that, in line with the discussion above, might be able to be used 
mutatis mutandis for human trafficking due to their origin in UNCLOS
128
. 
There will be no discussion on whether the rest of the slavery conventions 
can or should be able to be applicable for crimes of human trafficking.  
In summary, the legal situation whether trafficking can be included in the 
notion of slavery, or the other way around, is not as clear as it might seem at 
first glance. Each specific situation must be examined for this purpose. Yet, 
there exist clear overlaps between slavery and trafficking and the legal trend 
is moving towards a merging of the two notions. Even though there is a lack 
of legal certainty in this matter, the international community should strive 
for legal development and attempt to fuse the notion of trafficking together 
with slave-trade in the context of its prohibition on the high seas. Thus, for 
the sake of the slavery provisions in UNCLOS
129
, the transport of people 
subject to trafficking is to be considered to be applicable mutatis mutandis, 
although, in practice, it has to be established in each specific situation if the 
trafficking is of such nature, especially regarding ownership of the subject, 
whether it can be assimilated with slavery.  
 
3.2.1 Trafficking as Jus Cogens 
 
Slavery and slave-trade have for a long time been considered as jus cogens 
crimes due to their erga omnes nature and the need for worldwide 
prohibition. The Nürnberg Tribunal has in its charter and judgments 
recognized enslavement as a crime against humanity in international law
130
, 
though, the term was never defined. In the ICC statute, enslavement can still 
be found as an example of crimes against humanity, and in a definition 
provided, the term human trafficking includes enslavement as an example of 
                                               
128 UNCLOS is a much newer convention, but these provisions can be regarded as codified 
customary international law. 
129 UNCLOS article 99 and 110(1)(b). 
130 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and 
in the Judgment of the Tribunal, principle VI(c). International Law Commission at its 
second session, 1950. See: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_1_1950.pdf  
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trafficking.
131
  In other sources of law including scholarly writings, there is 
very little evidence of trafficking being included or assimilated to slavery as 
jus cogens.
132
  
According to Gallagher, it is not possible to rely on the connection with 
slavery for trafficking offences to be regarded as part of slavery’s status as 
customary international law.
133
 This would also exclude its status as jus 
cogens which is higher in the hierarchy and thus harder to achieve. It is only 
the traditional notion of slavery that can be proved of having acquired the 
status of jus cogens and this notion of the term “slavery” is so fundamental 
for the establishment of jus cogens that is does not change at the same pace 
as a normal international crime.
 
There is thus reason to separate the 
international crime of slavery where trafficking may be included, with 
slavery as jus cogens which still only entail the traditional crime in which 
trafficking may not yet be included. 
 Bassiouni writes that the inclusion of trafficking as an example of 
enslavement in the ICC statute illustrates that there are situations where an 
act may qualify as enslavement even though no true “slave labour” has 
taken place and it thus works as a safe-guard to make sure that no escape for 
the offender exists by a simple statement that no “work” took place.134 If 
this is the main reason for the inclusion of trafficking in the definition
135
 it is 
not clear, and at this point in time it does not seem to matter. As mentioned 
above, there is a need for clear opinio juris for the establishment of a jus 
cogens norm, and this does not seem to exist in the case of human 
trafficking. The inclusion of trafficking as an example of enslavement in the 
ICC statute is a good start but it is simply not yet enough.  
 
3.3 Marine pollution 
 
The UN advisory body GESAMP
136
 defines pollution as  
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or 
energy into the marine environment (including estuaries) resulting in 
                                               
131 See footnote 110.  
132 Compare International Law Commission’s Draft articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts,  with commentaries 2001 Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, p. 112; Oosterveld, Valerie, “Gender-based 
Crimes Against Humanity” in Leila Nadya Sadat (eds.), Forging a Convention for Crimes 
Against Humanity. Cambridge University Press, 2011.; Kaczorowka; Bassiouni, Cherif M, 
Crimes Against Humanity, Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application. Cambridge 
University Press, 2011. chapter 6;  Guilfoyle, pp. 75-76 and chapter 8; and Brownlie, 
chapter 23. 
133 See footnote 127. 
134 Bassiouni (2011) p. 380. 
135 It is not apparent in the text if it is Bassiouni’s opinion that this is its only function, or if 
he has just mentioned one illustrative consequence of the inclusion of trafficking as an 
example of enslavement. 
136 Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection. 
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such deleterious effects as harm to living resources, hazards to 
human health, hindrance to marine activities including fishing, 
impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of 
amenities. 
137
 
The MARPOL convention
138
 recognizes that “deliberate, negligent or 
accidental release of oil and other harmful substances from ships constitutes 
a serious source of pollution”139. When discussing pollution in a wide scope, 
almost any type of substance can be said to have a harmful effect, especially 
considering the fact that even discharge of ordinary ballast water from a 
different region can have a harmful effect on the marine environment
140
. 
The list of substances might seem infinite, and for this reason, the 
discussion will only concern pollution by oil
141
 which is one of the more 
distressing contributors of marine pollution. The polluting oil can enter the 
sea in different ways, e.g. from land-sources; from the air in form of acid 
rain; and from vessels. It is the latter form of pollution that this thesis will 
focus on. 
The disposal of oil from vessels can be executed mainly in three different 
ways. Either the pollutant can enter the sea as the result of an accident 
(involuntary) or by operational discharge or by deliberate dumping, both of 
which are voluntary. The biggest contributor to this type of discharge relates 
to the normal operation of a vessel, i.e. operational discharge. This is often a 
necessary element for the operation of a vessel, much due to the fact that a 
vessel operates in the marine environment and it is thus hard to avoid any 
oil or oily mixtures from e.g. the machinery spaces, ending up there.
142
  This 
does not mean that this type of discharge is permissible. It is regulated 
through a regime whose object is to prevent and reduce these operational 
discharges and it includes port reception facilities as well as regulations on 
technologies for reductions of polluting substances in e.g. tank washings.
143
   
The MARPOL convention which was amended through the 1978 Protocol 
to aid the entry into force of the convention is the first instrument of its kind 
with the principal objective of protecting the marine environment.
144
 The 
                                               
137 GESAMP Reports and  Studies No.47. 
138 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as modified by the 
Protocol of 1978 relating thereto. 
139 Preamble of MARPOL 73. 
140 See the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast 
Water and Sediments (BWM). The convention will enter into force 12 months after 
ratification by 30 States, representing 35 per cent of world merchant shipping tonnage. 31 
January 2013, the convention had 36 member states that together represents 29,07% of 
world merchant shipping tonnage.  
141 This is defined in MARPOL 73/78 Annex 1, regulation 1(1). 
142
 Mukherjee, Proshanto K., “The Penal Law of Ship-Source Marine Pollution: Selected 
Issues in Perspective" in Tafsir Malick Ndiaye and Rudiger Wolfrum (eds.), Law of the 
Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, pp. 
463-496. At pp. 467-468. 
143 See IMO web page: 
http://www.imo.org/ourwork/environment/pollutionprevention/portreceptionfacilities/Pages
/Default.aspx 
144 Preamble of MARPOL 1973. 
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substantive part of the convention is regulated in its annexes, where only the 
first two are mandatory for all member states. Annex I deals with pollution 
by oil. MARPOL had in January 2013, 152 state parties which together 
represents 99,2% of the world tonnage.
145
 
Regulation 15 of Annex I prohibits any discharge of oil or oily mixtures into 
the sea, except when certain conditions are met. Regulation 4 of the same 
convention states that regulation 15 is not applicable if the discharge was a 
consequence of a lifesaving operation or to damage to the ship or its 
equipment. This entails that accidental discharge is not prohibited under 
MARPOL provided all precautions for the prevention or minimizing of 
pollution damage was taken after the discovery of the discharge, and under 
the presumption that the discharge was not caused with intent or by reckless 
behaviour while knowing that pollution damage would be a probable 
consequence.
146
 Noteworthy is that this is no longer the situation within the 
European Union (EU) after the heavily criticized Directive 2005/35/EC
147
 
which has taken the criminalization of accidental pollution a step further by 
making accidental discharge in the territorial sea of a European member 
state an offence, if it is caused by “serious negligence”.148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
145 IMO status of conventions.  
146 MARPOL 73/78, annex I, regulation 4.2. 
147 Amended through Directive 2009/123/EC. 
148 See article 3-5 of the Directive 2005/35/EC. 
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4. Jurisdictions in the Zones  
 
4.1 The Territorial sea 
 
The territorial sea is defined in UNCLOS as the extension of a coastal 
state’s sovereignty from its land out to the adjacent sea,149 up to a maximum 
distance of 12 nautical miles measured from the state’s baselines.150 Exactly 
what state sovereignty entails is not mentioned in UNCLOS, but has to be 
understood through other bodies of international law as well as customary 
international law
151
. Instead, UNCLOS states that the sovereignty of the 
coastal state may be subject to exceptions in both the convention as well as 
in other rules of international law.
152
 
The most extensive exemption of coastal state sovereignty in the territorial 
sea is the right of innocent passage for all states through the territorial sea, 
not depending on the flag of the vessel in passage. According to Liljedahl, 
the extent of coastal states’ enforcement jurisdiction in relation to passage 
through the territorial sea is uncertain. States treat this issue in different 
ways and it would be far too extensive go further into that topic.
153
 Instead, 
the following discussion will concern the customary international law 
aspects as codified in UNCLOS. 
In UNCLOS it does not matter whether the passage of a foreign flagged 
vessel is through the territorial sea without entering a port or internal water 
of the coastal state, or if the object of the passage is to enter the state’s 
internal waters, as long as the passage can be said to be “continuous and 
expeditious”154, i.e. a vessel cannot rely on this exemption of coastal state 
sovereignty while it cruises around or lingers in the territorial sea. For a 
passage to be deemed as “innocent” it cannot be “prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal State”155 and what this includes can be 
found in the second paragraph of article 19 in UNCLOS. The exemptions 
(b) “any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind”; (h) “any act of 
wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention” and; (l) any other 
activity not having a direct bearing on passage” are of relevance in this 
context. The first exemption can be relevant for the crimes of piracy and 
trafficking while the latter may relate to any of the discussed crimes. If the 
                                               
149 UNCLOS article 2(1). 
150 Ibid article 3. 
151 See Brierly, J.L., The Law of Nations, an Introduction to the International Law of Peace. 
6th ed, Edited by Sir Humphrey Waldock. Oxford University Press, 1963., pp. 7-16; 
Brownlie chapter 14; and The ILC Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, 1949. 
152 UNCLOS article 2(3). 
153 Liljedahl, J. (2002).  Transnational and international crimes: Jurisdictional issues. (P. K. 
Mukherjee, M. Q. Mejia Jr., G. M. Gauci, Ed.).Maritime Violence and other Security Issues 
at Sea: The Proceedings of the Symposium on Maritime Violence and other Security Issues 
at Sea. Pp. 115-131., 26-30 August, Malmö: World Maritime University. At p. 120. 
154 UNCLOS article 18(2). 
155 Ibid article 19(1). 
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passage of a foreign vessel is regarded as non-innocent in accordance with 
article 19, the coastal state is allowed to take any necessary steps to prevent 
the passage through its territorial sea, i.e. the exemption of state sovereignty 
due to innocent passage is no longer applicable. 
 A coastal state may not hamper the innocent passage of foreign flagged 
vessels
156
, but the state is allowed to regulate the passage in respect of 
matters relating to a list found in article 21(1), where only (e) “the 
preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the preservation, 
reduction and control of pollution thereof”, is relevant for the discussed 
crimes. If the coastal state has clear grounds for suspecting that a vessel 
violated any of these pollution regulations in the territorial sea, the state is 
allowed to undertake an inspection of the vessel and take judicial 
proceedings against the vessel.
157
  
As mentioned earlier, the flag state has jurisdiction over its vessels at all 
times, and while this vessel is within the territorial sea, the flag state and the 
coastal state have concurrent jurisdiction over criminal actions. For vessels 
passing through the territorial sea, the coastal state should refrain from 
exercising its jurisdiction as long as the crime cannot be said to be included 
in the list in article 27 of UNCLOS. These are  
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; 
(b)  if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good 
order of the territorial sea; 
(c)  if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master 
of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or 
(d)  if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 
Liljedahl writes that, in practise, this mean that the coastal state will only 
exercise its jurisdiction in cases mentioned in (b); in cases where the offence 
was committed by a person who does not belong to the vessel
158
; if a person 
is wanted by the coastal state; if the master of the vessel or the flag state has 
requested the costal state to intervene; and in cases directly involving 
navigation, fishing or customs.
159
 
 If a vessel is only passing through the territorial sea of the coastal state 
without entering its internal waters, the coastal state is only allowed to take 
actions against a vessel for crimes committed before entering into the 
territorial sea, if the basis for the offence is found in Part XII of the 
convention, which concerns the protection of the marine environment.
160
 
 
                                               
156 UNCLOS article 24(1). 
157 Ibid article 220(2). 
158 As neither crew nor passenger. 
159 Liljedahl, p. 121. 
160 UNCLOS article 27(4). 
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4.2 The Contiguous zone 
 
The contiguous zone, which has a maximum breadth of 24 nautical miles 
measured from the baselines of the coastal state, overlaps the territorial sea 
and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In this zone the coastal state may 
exercise control to: 
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; 
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations 
committed within its territory or territorial sea
161 
Through this article, a coastal state has in the waters adjacent to the 
territorial sea, not sovereignty, but enforcement jurisdictions for the matters 
mentioned in (a). In the territorial sea, the state has an additional way of 
taking action against a delinquent foreign flagged vessel which overrides the 
right of innocent passage due to the fact that the coastal state has the right to 
exercise its authority in the contiguous zone. States which have not yet 
claimed an EEZ, the contiguous zone actually provides the coastal state with 
enforcement jurisdiction over parts of the high seas.
162
  
 
4.3 The EEZ 
 
The Exclusive Economic Zone, or the EEZ as it is commonly known, is a 
relatively new feature in the Law of the Sea. It was first introduced in 
connection with the preparations for what later developed into UNCLOS
163
. 
The EEZ has its roots in the ambition of coastal states to get more control 
over the economic resources in the waters outside their territory, mainly fish 
stocks, as well as the authority to prevent other states to exploit these 
resources.
164
 Today, UNCLOS has established the EEZ as subject to a 
“specific legal regime”165 found in, and governed by, the convention. In this 
zone, the coastal state does not have full sovereignty as in the territorial sea, 
but states have far more authority in comparison with the high seas. This is 
shown in article 58 which gives states the obligation to pay due regard to 
any coastal state’s rights and duties as well as be in compliance with the 
coastal state’s laws and regulations that are in accordance with the 
provisions regarding the EEZ in UNCLOS, but in return there are some 
rights of the high seas that still apply in the EEZ. These include free right of 
navigation and overflight of all foreign flagged vessels, as well as right of 
                                               
161 UNCLOS article 33(1). 
162 See the Convention of the Territorial Sea, 1958, article 24; and Brownlie, p. 192. 
163 Different authors refers to this convention by different names, but this thesis uses, as 
earlier mentioned, the abbreviation “UNCLOS” for the 1982 convention on the Law of the 
Sea. 
164 Churchill and Lowe, pp. 160-161.  
165 UNCLOS article 55. 
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all states to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and all activities related to 
these freedoms that can be considered lawful in international law.
 166
 In 
addition to this, the provisions provided for the high seas in UNCLOS are 
applicable for the EEZ, as well as “other pertinent rules of international 
law”167 as long as they are not incompatible with the rules in UNCLOS 
especially established for the EEZ. 
The EEZ may be claimed for a maximum length of 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines
168
 and the coastal state has: 
jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this 
Convention with regard to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations 
and structures;  
(ii)  marine scientific research; 
(iii)  the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment
169
 
 
The distinctive feature of this zone is the coastal state’s sovereign rights to 
explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources, both living and 
non-living, existing in the seabed, beneath the seabed,  as well as the water 
superjacent to it.
170
 In regards to these rights, the coastal state has authority 
to take necessary measures against a suspected delinquent vessel, e.g. 
boarding, inspection and judicial proceedings.
171
 Coastal states may also 
adopt laws and regulations that give effect to international rules and 
standards from the “competent international organization” (the IMO) for the 
enforcement of laws concerning prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution from vessels
172
. 
In special circumstances where the coastal state has reasons to believe, and 
can prove through scientific evidence, that there is an area within the EEZ 
which is of such delicate ecological nature that it needs special protection 
from marine pollution that is not sufficiently provided for in existing 
international regulations, the coastal state may, if the IMO agrees to this, 
adopt pollution preventative regulations for special areas as provided for by 
the IMO.
173
 
4.4 The High Seas 
 
The high seas is defined as all parts of the sea that does not constitute the 
EEZ , territorial sea or internal waters of a coastal state.
174
 The high seas 
                                               
166 UNCLOS article 58(1). 
167 Ibid. article 58(2). 
168 Ibid.  article 57. 
169 Ibid. article 56(1)(b). 
170 Ibid. article 56(1)(a). 
171 Ibid. article 73(1). 
172 Ibid. article 211(5). 
173 Ibid.  article 211(6)(a). 
174 Or archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state. See UNCLOS article 86. 
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“shall be reserved for peaceful purposes”175 and cannot be subject to any 
state sovereignty.
176
 It is open to all states and all states, coastal as well as 
land-locked
177
 have the right to enjoy the six freedoms of the high seas 
which are: freedom of navigation; freedom of overflight; freedom to law 
submarine cables and pipelines; freedom to construct artificial islands and 
other installations; freedom of fishing; and freedom of scientific research.
178
  
Since the high seas is not subject to any state sovereignty, it is neither 
subject of any state jurisdiction on a territorial basis. The question is on 
what basis jurisdiction can be exercised when a vessel is sailing the high 
seas. The general answer to this question of jurisdiction is today found in 
article 92 in UNCLOS, which states that a vessel is only allowed one flag 
state, and it is this state that has exclusive jurisdiction when the vessel is 
sailing on the high seas. For another state to be able to exercise jurisdiction 
with regard to an action or incident that took place on the high seas, there 
must be an exceptional situation for which there is provision in UNCLOS or 
other international treaties. This principle of flag state jurisdiction is older 
than the convention in which it is found today; it was an established 
principle already at the time of the Lotus case in 1926
179
. Regarding penal 
jurisdiction for the master and crew of a vessel on the high seas, there is a 
specific exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state in article 97 
of UNCLOS which, as will be explained below, came into existence after 
the Lotus case. This article fulfils the principle of active personality 
jurisdiction, and it provides opportunity for the state to which the master or 
crew-member is a citizen to exercise penal jurisdiction. It is important to 
note that this does not exclude the flag state’s jurisdiction, but give both 
states concurrent jurisdiction in the matter.  
 
4.4.1 Exceptions to the Flag State Jurisdiction 
 
Although the general rule in international law states that the flag state has 
exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas in all cases except regarding penal 
jurisdiction, there do exists a few other exceptions. Some crimes are of such 
a nature that they have acquired universal jurisdiction provided explicit by 
UNCLOS, and other offences are considered of such exceptional a nature 
that state co-operation in the suppression of this type of action is encouraged 
on the high seas. These offences can be found in UNCLOS, e.g. unlawful 
broadcasting and prohibition of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, or which 
                                               
175 UNCLOS article 88. 
176 Ibid. article 89. 
177 Ibid. article 87 and 90. 
178 Ibid. article 87(1). 
179 The Lotus, para. 64.See chapter 2.2.1.1. See also article 6 in HSC as well as UNCLOS 
article 92. 
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have their origins in treaty law, e.g. terrorist acts at sea
180
, and they are often 
exercised through various conventions and regional agreements
181
.  
 As mentioned above, in UNCLOS article 92, the exclusivity of flag state 
jurisdiction might be avoided for cases stipulated in an international treaty. 
It is thus up to states to decide between themselves what wrongful acts they 
consider as offences of such a degree that the exclusivity of the flag state 
jurisdiction ought to be disregarded. These conventions do not provide all 
states with additional jurisdiction like UNCLOS does for piracy and hot 
pursuit, but they merely provide an obligation for states to among 
themselves criminalise the actions referred to. If this is done by states, those 
states’ jurisdictions will stretch to vessels flying their flag and in some cases 
even for nationals of that state
182
. These conventions may even include an 
element where states can authorize other member states to exercise 
jurisdiction over that state’s vessels.183  
 
4.4.1.1 Hot Pursuit  
 
Where a violation of a state’s national laws has taken place, or it is 
suspected that it has taken place within the internal waters, the territorial sea 
or the contiguous zone of that state, it is allowed to pursue the delinquent 
vessel and take action against it even on the high seas. The requirements are 
that the vessel is, at the beginning of the pursuit, still located within a zone 
of the coastal state, and that the pursuit is done without interruption. This 
provision is found in UNCLOS article 111 and allows states to prevent the 
possibility of getting away with an offence by escaping to the high seas. The 
right of hot pursuit is terminated once the vessel has entered the territorial 
sea of another state.  
Even though this is a clear exception to flag state jurisdiction for a vessel on 
the high seas, it can also be seen as an extension of the territorial rights of 
the coastal state for crimes committed there. Without this right, it would be 
too easy for a delinquent vessel to escape liability for offences committed in 
the maritime territory of the coastal state.  
The right of hot pursuit is considered to be customary law and a right the 
coastal state always has no matter what flag the delinquent vessel is flying. 
                                               
180 See the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA). 
181 For examples, see the Vienna Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotic substances adopted in 1988, and the Council of Europe’s Agreement on Illicit 
Traffic by Sea, implementing Article 17 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 
182 According to the passive/active nationality principle. 
183 The exception in this context is the Intervention Convention which is applicable to all 
vessels no matter member status of the flag state. This is legitimate due to UNCLOS article 
221(1) which gives states authority to protect its coastline from pollution following a 
maritime casualty.  
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Neither does it matter what offence was committed, as long as it was a law 
of the coastal state.  
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5. Dealing with the Crimes 
 
It has been discussed above what jurisdictions prevail in the different 
maritime zones and how the crimes of piracy, trafficking and oil pollution, 
reflect international law. This chapter will connect the previous discussions 
to see out how the crimes can be dealt with in international law, i.e. for what 
situations a coastal state have jurisdiction over the matter. 
 
5.1 Piracy 
 
Piracy is one of those crimes against the international community of such a 
detestable nature that it has been granted universal jurisdiction. This is 
shown in article 105 in UNCLOS, which gives every state the right to seize 
a pirate ship and any other vessels under the control of pirates as well as the 
right to arrest the responsible individuals. Another indication of universal 
jurisdiction is article 110, “the right of visit”, which allows states suspecting 
a vessel to be engaged in piracy, to board and search the vessel. This may be 
done in any part of the world outside the jurisdiction of any state, and it is 
the seizing state that has the right to decide on penalties and further 
actions
184
.  Since piracy has universal jurisdiction, the pirate itself is 
considered as hostis humani generis
185
 against whom proceedings may be 
initiated in an international tribunal or by a court in any state in the world, 
regardless of where the offence took place or the nationality of the 
suspected pirates.  
An issue that complicates the suppression of piracy is the fact that due to 
state sovereignty, a state cannot without consent pursue and arrest a 
suspected pirate or seize a pirate ship in another state’s territory.186 This 
might have the result that a pirate vessel can escape liability if it 
successfully flees into the territorial waters of a state which chooses not to 
take any action against this vessel.
187
 In Somalia where the situation 
concerning pirates has been extremely difficult, the United Nations Security 
Council adopted a Resolution in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, chapter VII, giving states right for a period of 12 months to: 
                                               
184 UNCLOS article 105. 
185   A term said to be first used by the Roman politician Cicero. Pirata est hostis humani 
generis which translates to “a pirate is the common enemy of humankind.”  It is said to be 
an abbreviation of  his phrase Nam pirata non est ex perduellium numero definitus, sed 
communis hostis omnium; *** hoc nec fides debet nec ius iurandum esse commune. 
Translated: “For a pirate is not included in the list of lawful enemies, but is the common 
enemy of all; among pirates and other men there ought be neither mutual faith nor binding 
oath.” From De Officiis, Book III, Ch. XXIX, p. 107. 
186 Shaw, p. 398. 
187 Which de facto is against international law according to UNCLOS article 100, but then 
it is a question of whom has the right and interest to take action against the passive state. 
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 Enter into the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of 
repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner 
consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with respect 
to piracy under relevant international law
188
 
This extension of hot pursuit is offensive to the sovereignty of Somalia, but 
is a last recourse that was found justifiable for the keeping and restoration of 
peace. Measures like this are only to be used in extreme situations where 
there exists a great threat to peace. In all other situations where there is no 
authority granted by the Security Council, states are dependent on the 
coastal state to fulfil its responsibility in international law to take action 
against the pirate vessel when it can be found within its territorial sea.  
A states which have confined a suspected pirate but does not want to 
proceed with prosecution for any reason, can, after negotiation with a 
willing state, extradite him or her according to national laws and extradition 
agreements between the two states. The coastal state is for this reason not 
solely responsible for holding the suspected pirate responsible, but only for 
seizing the vessel, and taking appropriate measures until another state can, 
and is willing to take over. 
As seen in chapter 3, the definition of piracy in UNCLOS has excluded 
many types of crimes that are of the same criminal nature, they might even 
be the exact same actions although e.g. not undertaken for private ends or 
are committed in the territorial sea of a state. These would hopefully be 
considered as criminal offences in domestic law, including the criminal 
offence of armed robbery; they can in no case be considered piracy jus 
gentium. These crimes titled “armed robbery at sea” by the IMO, cannot be 
considered as piracy according to UNCLOS, but the act may constitute an 
“unlawful act” and can thus be tackled though the SUA convention which in 
its original version has been adopted by 160 states. The IMO titillation is 
not binding international law but considered as para-droit, the offence must 
therefore exist in other documents of international law as well, e.g. the SUA 
convention. 
189
  
 
5.1.1 Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
 
This convention first focused on what actions states are allowed to take 
following a terrorist action at sea, however, after 11 September 2001, it was 
concluded that there was a need for preventive measures relating to the use 
of ships in terrorist activities to be included in the convention.
190
 This 
resulted in the 2005 amendments which, among other things, broaden the 
                                               
188 Resolution 1846 (2008), issue 10(a). 
189 IMO summary of Status of Conventions, as of 2013-01-31. The 2005 version has so far 
only 23 member states, and the 2005 protocol only 19, but more are on the way, e.g. 
Sweden where the matter is under process, see Departementsserie 2011:43 Sveriges 
tillträde till överenskommelser inom FN om bekämpande av terrorism. 
190 Tuerk, p. 15. 
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scope of crimes with three additional articles regarding types of criminal 
activities. There is little difference between the original and the amended 
version in the relevant articles and for this reason only the amended version 
of the convention will be referred to, even though it is not yet in force.  
The legal foundation of this convention is not derived directly from 
UNCLOS or any other source of customary law like the situation with 
piracy jus gentium. Instead, its legitimacy for acts on the high seas is found 
in the general rule in article 92 which has the exception of exclusive flag 
state jurisdiction for exceptional cases provided by an international treaty.
191
 
This is one of those treaties.  
The convention requires states to criminalize the offences described in 
article 3; 3bis; 3ter and 3quater
192, for vessel’s flying the state’s flag, for its 
nationals and for crimes committed in its territory, including the territorial 
sea. It is also encouraged that states in its national laws provide for 
jurisdiction to deal with stateless persons who reside in that state, as well as 
for people covered by the passive personality principle. Even if a state does 
not have jurisdiction based on these categories, a state should take measures 
to establish jurisdiction over those people found within its territory in cases 
where the state does not extradite the criminal to those member states that 
have jurisdiction based on the primary categories.
193
 When a state exercises 
its jurisdiction according to this convention, it has to pay due regard not to 
interfere with coastal state’s and flag state’s rights and jurisdiction 
according to UNCLOS.
194
 
The geographical scope of the convention is found in article 4(1) SUA and it 
states that the convention applies for crimes taken place when the vessel is: 
navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters 
beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, or the 
lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States.
195
 
Even if these geographical requirements above are not fulfilled, the 
convention still applies if the suspected criminal can be found in the 
territory of a state party to the convention, other than the one referred to in 
the quote above.
196
  
This convention is one of those that can be considered constituting quasi-
universal jurisdiction according to Shaw
197
.  An action that in all aspects 
only concerns non-state parties, e.g. if it takes place on a vessel registered in 
a non-state party on the high seas, and which only affects persons of non- 
                                               
191 The legal foundation for actions in the territorial sea is the state sovereignty found in 
article 2, the passage cannot be considered as innocent according to article 19. In the EEZ, 
all states enjoy the freedom of navigation for lawful purposes, something this cannot be 
said to constitute, see article 58(1). 
192 Article 3bis, 3ter and 3quater are from the 2005 protocol. 
193 SUA article 6. 
194 Ibid. article 8bis(9)(c). 
195 Ibid. article 4(1). 
196 Ibid. article 4(2). 
197 See part 2.4, “Universal Jurisdiction”. 
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state parties or states which have not adopted the passive personality 
principle, it will not fall within the scope of this convention since none of 
the state parties have jurisdiction over the action. If the action would be of 
universal jurisdictional nature, i.e. piracy jus gentium, the nationality of the 
victims of the action or other jurisdiction criteria mentioned above would 
not matter since any state would be entitled to prosecute the crime not 
depending on where or by whom it was committed.  
The criteria concerning geography is the same in both universal jurisdiction 
and quasi-universal jurisdiction found in the SUA convention article 6(4), 
since, as mentioned above, even with universal jurisdiction the criminal 
needs to be within the territory of the forum state at the time of prosecution.  
Since the list of crimes with universal jurisdiction is a very limited and 
exclusive list reserved for the worst crimes against mankind and hostis 
humani generis, this is not something states can agree upon in a treaty, but 
something that needs to be developed through careful consideration and 
opinio juris. And since this is bound to take time, an agreement like this 
convention is as close as states may get by themselves, and it is a step in the 
direction of providing these crimes with universal jurisdiction.
198
  
 
5.1.2 Universal Jurisdiction in the EEZ 
 
One requirement for piracy jus gentium is that the act is committed outside 
the jurisdiction of a state. The same wording was used in the HSC which 
existed before the notion of EEZ was introduced. When considering the 
provisions regulating the coastal state’s possible jurisdictions in the EEZ, 
none of which concern piracy, it can be regarded that for the sake of acts of 
piracy, the crime is committee outside of the coastal state’s normal 
jurisdiction.
199
 
There are primarily two ways of regarding this complicated issue of acts of 
piracy in the EEZ. Either the starting point of discussion is the sovereignty 
of the coastal state in the EEZ, and that article 58(2), which states that 
articles 88 to 115 concerning the high seas are applicable to the EEZ as long 
as they are not incompatible with provisions in Part V of the convention
200
, 
merely provides non-coastal states with those freedoms existing on the high 
seas in cases where this is compatible with Part V. Or, the starting point of 
discussion is the freedom of the seas in the EEZ and that the coastal state 
only has those exclusive rights and jurisdictions as provided for in Part V of 
the convention. 
                                               
198 Especially considering that on 31 January 2013, SUA 1988 had 160 state parties which 
together represent 94.63% of the world tonnage and SUA 2005 had 23state parties 
representing 30,49% of the world tonnage. Source: IMO Status of Conventions, see IMO 
website. 
199 This conclusion, although not necessarily the arguments, is shared by Liljedahl p. 122. 
200 That deals with the specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone.  
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This is an area of legal uncertainty
201
, and it is this author’s opinion that for 
acts of piracy committed in the EEZ, universal jurisdiction should apply. 
This is not expressly stipulated in any article in UNCLOS, but when 
considering article 58(2), piracy cannot be said to be incompatible with any 
of those provisions and thus, acts of piracy should be able to be subject to 
the same jurisdiction in the EEZ in the same way as if the action took place 
on the high seas. This gives the result that the crime is granted with 
universal jurisdiction even in the EEZ and through this, any state may take 
action against both the vessel and the people on board, with observance of 
article 58(3).
202
  
 
5.1.3 Flag States’ Rights 
 
States have a legal duty in international law to take any possible measures to 
repress acts of piracy. If a flag state gets hold of information about a 
suspected piracy activity concerning a vessel carrying its flag, either through 
own sources or from other states, the flag state has to take appropriate 
measures and subject the suspected pirates to legal investigations. One 
problem is that the pirate ship might not have a nationality, or it may be a 
phantom ship with fake identity
203
 which will make the whole process of 
finding the responsible person, as well as finding a state with flag state 
jurisdiction, much more difficult.  
For unlawful actions that do not fully match piracy jus gentium, universal 
jurisdiction is not applicable. The SUA convention recognizes the exclusive 
flag state jurisdiction over vessels, cargo and persons unless it waives its 
jurisdiction in favour of other states with jurisdiction according to this 
convention.
204
 If a state other than the flag state suspects a vessel outside the 
territorial seas of any state to be involved in a criminal activity included in 
the convention, that state must always request authorisation from the flag 
state before boarding and searching the vessel
205
. There is no provision 
saying that the flag state must approve this request, on the contrary, the flag 
state has in this convention a right to decline authorisation for other states to 
                                               
201 Noyes, John E. Introduction to the International Law of Piracy, California Western 
International Law Journal, Vol. 21, Issue 1 (1990), pp. 105-122, at p. 108. 
202 Many authors have avoided this discussion, but support to this conclusion can be found 
in Chi, Manjiao, Finding out the Achilles Heels: Piracy Suppression under International 
Law and Chinese Law, Journal of East Asia and International Law, Vol. 5, Issue 1 (2012), 
pp. 7-36, at p. 16 footnote 47; and  Keyuan, Zou, Issues of Public International Law 
Relating to the Crackdown of Piracy in the South China Sea and Prospects for Regional 
Cooperation, Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 3, Issue 2 
(1999), pp. 524-544, at p. 530.  
203 See Mukherjee and Mejia, pp. 171-172. 
204 SUA article 6(1)(1), article 8bis(8), and article 8bis(9)(c). 
205 Parties to the convention can notify the Secretary-General that authorization is given if 
no response on a request from a state has been provided within four hours from the 
acknowledgement that a request to confirm nationality of a suspected person has been 
made. 
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board and search its vessels.
206
 Boarding may only be done without the 
express consent from the flag state if there is imminent danger to human life 
and if the right to take those measures can be found in a bilateral or 
multilateral agreement separate from the SUA convention
207
. 
This feature of flag state authorisation is quite distinguishable from the 
universal jurisdiction for crimes that can be considered as piracy. For those 
crimes, any state can take action not depending on what flag state that is 
involved or if this flag state provides consent to boarding.  
 
5.1.4 Conclusion 
 
In the territorial sea a crime cannot constitute piracy jus gentium, and thus 
the universal jurisdiction does not apply. Instead, those crimes that on the 
high seas would constitute piracy can in the territorial sea be tackled 
through the SUA convention, which requires coastal states to criminalise the 
stipulated actions. The result is thus that vessels, which have or are 
suspected of having committed acts of piracy in the territorial sea of a state 
party, are subject to coastal state jurisdiction. This may become very 
complicated if the active and maybe even the passive personality 
principle
208
 are used. But, as mentioned above, the convention is not 
prejudiced against coastal state jurisdiction, which leaves enforcement of 
the crimes in the territorial seas primarily with dual concurrent jurisdiction 
for the flag state as well as the coastal state.  
For crimes taking place in the territorial waters of a state that is not party to 
the SUA convention, that coastal state may still, according to its own 
national laws, seize and prosecute for the crime, as long as it is criminalised 
in national law. Other states, which have an interest in the matter, e.g. the 
flag state and states who claim jurisdiction based on active personality, still 
have jurisdiction over the responsible persons, but they do not have the right 
to seize the vessel within the territorial sea of the coastal state without 
express consent and thus have to ask for extradition of the suspected 
criminals before they can exercise their jurisdiction.  
If an act similar to that of piracy is committed in the territorial sea or the 
contiguous zone, but not captured there, the coastal state may still seize the 
vessel through the provision of hot pursuit in UNCLOS
209
 provided that all 
the criteria are met.  
                                               
206 SUA article 8bis(5)(e)(iv). 
207 Ibid. article 8bis(7). 
208 If this can be applicable is up to each state to regulate in national laws. In Sweden, the 
passive personality principle can only be used in areas where no other state has jurisdiction, 
mainly the high seas. See the Swedish Criminal code (Brottsbalk 1962:700), chapter 2, 
article 3.5. 
209 UNCLOS article 111. 
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In comparison with actions committed in the territorial sea which grants the 
right of hot pursuit to the adjacent zones, no such reversed right exists for 
crimes committed on the high seas when the vessel escapes to the territorial 
sea of a third state. It is thus fully possible for a delinquent vessel to escape 
responsibility by fleeing into a territorial sea, where of course it is faced 
with that state’s coastal state jurisdiction, although, for there to exist 
effective enforcement, it is required that the coastal state is active and that it 
has adopted enforcement rights to take action within its territory for a crime 
of piracy committed outside the territory of that state
210
.  
The relationship between coastal states’ possibility of enforcement 
jurisdiction and the strong right of the flag state is clearly illustrated in the 
SUA convention where a coastal state must ask the flag state for permission 
before taking action. The SUA convention deals with a situation where 
states have given themselves jurisdiction which normally would not exist, 
and it is thus especially important not to violate the sovereignty of the flag 
state, which may not be a party to the convention, through ignoring its 
jurisdiction. By “asking for permission” and always keeping the flag state 
informed and supplied with a veto to stop actions, other states can exercise 
jurisdiction where needed without violating the sovereignty of the flag state. 
It is to be kept in mind is that the crimes covered by the convention are the 
absolute most detestable forms of terrorism at sea. Through this mechanism, 
the problem with FOC registries (to keep the old language) is avoided by 
providing other states with the opportunity to take action where the flag 
state wishes to be passive, and thus the FOC state does not have to be in 
violation of international law by remaining passive while states that actually 
want, and are willing to work for safer seas, have the right and opportunity 
to take actions against delinquent vessels.    
 
5.2 Human Trafficking 
 
It was concluded in chapter 3 that it is not, yet, the case that trafficking can 
be regarded as a jus cogans crime. If the situation was different, which it 
might very well be in the future, this criminal activity might be able to be 
accessed through universal jurisdiction with the result that the discussion 
concerning enforcement will be the same as regarding piracy. Until then,  
the provisions in UNCLOS regarding prohibition of transport of slaves on 
the high seas can, or at least should be able to be used mutatis mutandis for 
transport of people subject to human trafficking. This has the consequence 
that according to international law, flag states have the responsibility to take 
effective measures against vessels flying its flag while engaged in this 
activity.
211
 No further mentioning of this, or any mentioning of trafficking 
can be found in UNCLOS, and thus, the detailed provisions on how this 
                                               
210 Sweden has criminalized such actions in the Criminal code (Brottsbalk 1962:700). 
Chapter 2, article 3.6. It should be read together with chapter 13, article 5a.  
211 See UNCLOS article 99. 
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prohibition is to be carried out in practice is left to be decided by other 
instruments of international law.  
Slavery is primarily dealt with in international law through the 1926 Slavery 
Convention which is amended through the Supplementary Convention on 
the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery from 1956
212
. The latter includes a requirement to 
criminalise the transport of slaves not depending on means of transport in 
national law, and to make sure that vessels flying the state’s flag, as well as 
making sure that ports and coasts are not used for this purpose.
213
  
 
5.2.1 Palermo Protocol 
 
The primary legal framework for trafficking is the Palermo Protocol which 
belongs to quite a new convention
214
 that, even though it has only been in 
force for 10 years
215
, has received a lot of attention and has already acquired 
154 parties
216
. A big part of the convention is about state parties providing 
and offering each other assistance in the aftermath of any of the applicable 
crimes, e.g. investigation and prosecution.
217
 This is a very interesting and 
extensive regime that unfortunately is outside the scope of this thesis. 
The Palermo Protocol
218
 states in its first article that “it shall be interpreted 
together with the Convention”219 and that the offences established in the 
Palermo Protocol shall be considered as offenses established within the 
convention. This has the important result that provisions of the convention 
are applicable for crimes with origin in the Protocol as well.
220
  
The Palermo Protocol places responsibility on states to take all necessary 
measures to criminalise all aspects of human trafficking
221
 and through the 
                                               
212
 Hereinafter known as the 1956 Slavery Convention. 
213 1956 Slavery Convention article 3.  
214 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by 
General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000. 
215 The Protocol entered into force 25-12-00.  
216UN treaty webpage:  
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-
a&chapter=18&lang=en 
217 See articles 16-21. 
218 There are actually two other protocols supplementing the convention: the Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; and the Protocol against the 
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and 
Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime. But, these are not important in this thesis and therefore, “the Protocol” 
will only refer to the  Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime. 
219 The Palermo Protocol article 1(1). 
220 Ibid. article 1(3). 
221 Ibid. article 5.  
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convention’s provision regarding jurisdiction222, states are required to 
establish jurisdiction over the crimes in their territorial sea and over vessels 
flying its flag.
223
 States are also encouraged to provide jurisdiction over 
people covered by the active and passive nationality principle as well as 
over responsible people that can be found in the territory of the state even 
though the crimes might have been committed outside of the territory of that 
state.
224
 
 
5.2.2 The Territorial Sea 
 
In the territorial sea, all states have the right to pass “innocently” without 
the passage being hampered by the coastal state. There are certain 
conditions for when a coastal state may regulate the innocent passage, and it 
does not seem, when reading article 21, that human trafficking can be 
included in any of those categories. The result is that as long as the vessel 
never enters the internal waters of the coastal state where it is no longer 
subject to the innocent passage regime, the coastal state is not allowed to 
hamper the vessels passage. However, the key issue for accessing the crime 
of human trafficking is whether the passage of a vessel engaged in human 
trafficking can be considered as innocent. When reading article 19 and 
scholarly writings
225
, the impression rendered is that it cannot be considered 
as innocent and the vessel is thus subject to coastal states’ sovereignty.  
Whether the coastal state has right to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over 
the vessel is based on UNCLOS’ article 27. Trafficking could be regarded 
as a crime that disturbs peace and “good order” of the territorial sea226, 
depending on how this activity is performed, e.g. the use of weapons on 
board, for those crimes that the coastal state might have the right to exercise 
jurisdiction over the vessel. Paragraph 4 of the same article, which deals 
with criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed before entering into the 
territorial sea, is not applicable in this case due to the fact that the crime in 
focus is the transport of people subject to trafficking, and the transport in 
itself is an on-going crime that is being undertaken while the vessel is 
passing through the territorial sea, the crime can thus not be considered as 
committed before entering into the territorial sea.  
A fundamental rule of the territorial sea regime is the extension of the 
coastal state’s sovereignty. In the 1926 Slavery Convention, there is an 
explicit requirement that the states criminalise transport of slaves in the 
territorial sea
227
. The 1956 Slavery Convention has not adopted the same 
                                               
222 OCC article 15. 
223 Ibid. article 15(1). 
224 Ibid. article 15(2)(a-b) and article 15(4). 
225 Churchill and Lowe, pp.85-86. 
226 UNCLOS article 27(1)(b). 
227 1926 Slavery Convention article 3(1). 
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language, but demands that states make transport of slaves
228
 between 
countries a criminal offence in national law.
229
 It can be understood that one 
form of transport between countries is by sea, and for this regulation to be 
functional, this will have to include a prohibition of transport of slaves in 
the territorial sea. As mentioned above concerning the close relationship 
between transport of slaves and transport of people subject to trafficking, it 
can be argued that these conventions establishing a requirement for state 
parties to criminalise transport of slaves in the territorial sea, today includes 
criminalisation of transport of people subject to human trafficking.
230
 For 
states parties to the Palermo Protocol, the situation is less complicated and 
simply contains a provision stating a requirement to criminalise trafficking 
in the territorial sea, as well as on vessels flying its flag, as mentioned 
above.  
 
5.2.3 The EEZ and the High Seas 
 
In both the EEZ and on the high seas, the rule concerning freedom of 
navigation is undeniable.
231
 There are no provisions in UNCLOS 
establishing sovereignty for coastal states over these zones, or providing 
coastal states with jurisdiction to legislate or take action against vessels 
suspected of human trafficking or similar activities. The conclusion must 
thus be that the legal situation concerning the EEZ can be assimilated to that 
of the high seas in this context, and the flag state thus has exclusive 
jurisdiction over its vessels, unless otherwise stipulated by international 
law.
232
  
Through the OCC and its supplementing Palermo Protocol, state parties 
have, or at least should have, established jurisdiction over vessels flying 
their flag and hopefully over people subject to the passive and active 
nationality principle as well, though this is not mandatory. This means that 
even in other parts of international law, it is, on the high seas and in the 
EEZ, primarily, the flag state which has jurisdiction over a vessel used for 
                                               
228 There also exist requirements in article 6 to criminalize the act of enslaving people, but 
that is outside the scope and interest of this essay. 
229 1956 Slavery Convention article 3(1). 
230 The basis for this conclusion is that the crime of human trafficking can be considered to 
be connected with the slavery crime. The general rule of  interpretation (article 31.1) in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatise, 1969, state that:  
 A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose. 
It is submitted that the “ordinary meaning” of slavery should include, in line with the 
discussion in part 3.2, human trafficking, and since the crime of transport of people subject 
to these crimes are so closely related that it is in line with the “object and purpose” of the 
slavery conventions to include human trafficking.  
231 See UNCLOS article 58 and 87(1)(a). 
232 As stated in UNCLOS article 92(1). 
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human trafficking, and the only way for other states to acquire jurisdiction is 
through the active and passive personality principle.   
Customary international law has one important resort for non-flag states that 
wish to get involved, and that is through “the right of visit”233. This 
provision allows warships that encounter a vessel suspected of engaging in 
slave trade or, through the discussion in part 3.2, engaged in human 
trafficking, to board and conduct investigations on board the vessel with “all 
possible consideration”234. But, unfortunately this does not provide the 
visiting state with jurisdiction over the crime. The findings of a state that 
exercises its right of visit according to article 110 can only be reported to 
the flag state
235
, which in its turn has the responsibility to punish the 
responsible persons under article 99. 
 
5.2.4 Conclusion 
 
As addressed above, flag states are required to regulate and take action 
against its vessels engaged in this activity and cannot be in compliance with 
international law while remaining passive. This is further emphasized by the 
conventions in which all of them include provisions regarding states to 
criminalise this unlawful act on their vessels.
236
 The result is that in the 
territorial sea, there exist concurrent jurisdictions between coastal states 
which are parties to either the slavery conventions or the Palermo Protocol, 
and the flag state. The concurrency is extended if states have adopted the 
passive and active nationality principle according to the OCC.
237
 
In the EEZ and on the high seas, a coastal state has limited legal 
opportunities for taking action against a delinquent vessel. Only if states 
have established jurisdiction based on the passive and active nationality 
principle in line with the Protocol, a non-flag state can take legal action 
against a delinquent vessel.  
 
5.3 Marine Pollution 
 
The protection of the marine environment is of such importance that its 
governing regime is placed in a part of its own in UNCLOS; part XII. Its 
first article houses the general obligation of states: “to protect and preserve 
                                               
233 UNCLOS article 110(1)(b). 
234 Ibid. article 110(2).  
235 Guilfoyle, p 76.  
236 1926 Slavery Convention article 3; 1956 Slavery Convention article 3(2); and the OCC 
article 15(1)(b). 
237 For a discussion on concurrent jurisdiction, see part 5.4 below. 
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the marine environment” 238. Vessel-sourced pollution is dealt with in article 
221 and it places obligations on states acting through an international 
organization or general diplomatic conference, to establish international 
regulations for the prevention and control of marine pollution.
239
 Flag states 
are also required to adopt laws and regulations having, as a minimum, the 
same effect as those international regulations for vessels flying its flag
240
, 
and to make sure that there exist effective enforcement mechanisms for the 
performance of the international regulations. Examples of these measures 
are the prevention of sailing for sub-standard vessels, that the vessels are 
inspected on a regular basis and that each vessel carries certificates to prove 
its regulation compliance. Penalties of adequate severity should be provided 
for any violation to discourage further delinquent behaviour.
241
  
 
5.3.1 The Territorial Sea 
 
In the territorial sea, coastal states are allowed to, as a consequence of its 
sovereignty, adopt national laws and regulations concerning protection of 
the environment, without this being considered as hampering the innocent 
passage regime.
242
 In addition, a passage is no longer innocent in cases of 
“wilful and serious pollution”243, which excludes accidental and negligently 
caused discharges as well as those discharges that do not have a major 
impact on the environment.
244
 But since a coastal state is allowed to regulate 
these matters, the issue of innocent passage is of less importance, the vessel 
has a duty to obey the coastal state’s regulations.  
If a suspected delinquent vessel has by free will entered into a port or off-
shore terminal of the coastal state, a port state regime is applicable. In short, 
whenever a vessel can be found within this area, the coastal (or port) state 
may initiate investigations and proceedings against this vessel even if the 
violation of international rules took place in the territorial waters or the 
EEZ. If the discharge took place in another state’s waters, the port state may 
only take initiate investigations and proceedings if this is requested by that 
state, the flag state or any other state whose environment is threatened by 
the discharge.
245
 Although the port state regime is very interesting, this is 
something outside the narrow scope of the thesis and will not be further 
discussed. 
                                               
238 UNCLOS article 192. 
239 Ibid. article 211(1). 
240 Ibid. article 211(2). 
241 Ibid. article 217. 
242 Ibid. article 21(1)(f); and UNCLOS article 211(4). 
243 Ibid. article 19(2)(h). 
244 Peters, Mary S; Kumar, Manu.,” Analysis of Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea 
under The Law of the Sea Regime 1982”.  European Energy and Environmental Law 
Review, December 2012,  p. 308. 
245 UNCLOS article 218(1-2). 
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The enforcement mechanism for pollution laws differs depending on where 
the discharge took place, where the vessel is found, and how serious the 
discharge is. If a vessel has violated pollution laws in the territorial sea, the 
coastal state may take measures against the vessel according to its own 
national law, as provided for in Part II of UNCLOS.
246
 For vessels 
suspected of violating pollution regulations through moderate discharges 
within the EEZ of the coastal state, and the vessel can be found in either the 
territorial sea or the EEZ, the coastal state only has the right to require the 
vessel to give information about its identity and of its last and next port of 
call so that the coastal state may be able to establish if the vessel has 
violated any pollution regulations.
247
 It is only if the vessel is suspected of a 
violation that resulted in “substantial discharge causing or threatening 
significant pollution of the marine environment” that the coastal state is 
allowed to physically inspect the vessel to find evidence about the pollution 
incident, and this only if the vessel has refused to provide the information 
mentioned or it can be suspected when considering the factual situation that 
the information provided about the incident is not the complete truth.
248
 If 
“clear objective elements” indicate that the vessel is responsible for “major 
damage or threat of major damage”249 to the coastal state’s interests, the 
state is allowed to initiate proceedings against the vessels in the manner 
provided for in national laws irrespective of any provided information about 
next port of call etc. 
It is thus clear that the coastal state has jurisdiction over vessel-sourced 
pollution, and according to article 27
250
, the coastal state is also entitled to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over the vessel since consequences of 
marine pollution might affect the coastal state. This may also be done even 
if the violation took place before the vessel entered into the territorial sea 
when provided in Part XII
251
 of the convention.
252
 
 
5.3.2 The EEZ 
 
The coastal state’s right to adopt laws for prevention and control of marine 
pollution in the territorial sea, is applicable even for the EEZ, but only for 
enforcement purposes established in UNCLOS.
253
 These include the right of 
the coastal state to take actions against a pollution violation in the EEZ, 
depending on the severity of the discharge and the threat of damage.
254
 The 
right of enforcement measures for these violations in the EEZ is the same as 
                                               
246 UNCLOS article 220(2). 
247 Ibid. article 220(3). 
248 Ibid. article 220(5). 
249 Ibid. article 220(6). 
250 Ibid. article27(1)(b) to be exact. 
251 Concerning protection and preservation of the marine environment.  
252 UNCLOS article 27(5). 
253 Ibid. article 211(5). 
254 See UNCLOS article 220, discussed in 5.3.1. 
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for vessels found in the territorial sea which has already been discussed 
above.
255
 But, for pollution violations in the EEZ, where the vessel cannot 
be found in the territorial sea or the EEZ, i.e. it has successfully escaped to 
the high seas; the coastal state may not take action unless the criteria for hot 
pursuit are fulfilled. If the vessel instead has escaped to another state’s 
territorial sea or EEZ, the right of hot pursuit does not exist and there must 
thus be an agreement between the two coastal states for the first state to be 
able to pursue the delinquent vessel. As mentioned before, the flag state 
always has jurisdiction over its vessels and this state can always hold the 
delinquent vessel responsible for a marine pollution violation, as long as this 
particular situation that has occurred is criminalised in the flag state’s 
national law. Whenever the coastal state has taken action against a foreign 
flagged vessel, the flag state should be notified, this includes a submission 
of all official reports concerning the violation. 
256
 
 
5.3.3 The High Seas  
 
There are unfortunately not many special provisions regarding pollution 
incidents on the high seas. To solve the jurisdictional matters, there is thus a 
need to resort to the general provisions which involve the freedoms of the 
high seas as well as the right of hot pursuit. If a vessel has violated pollution 
regulations of the coastal state, that state may pursue the vessel from waters 
within the contiguous zone, and eventually take action against the vessel 
even on the high seas, if this is in accordance with the hot pursuit provision 
in UNCLOS.  
The only relevant article in UNCLOS relating to marine pollution on the 
high seas is article 221 which allows states to take measures to protect its 
interests
257
 from pollution damage, if the pollution can reasonably be 
expected to bring “major harmful consequences”258, and the pollution in 
itself is a consequence of a maritime casualty
259
. The requirement in 
UNCLOS is that the measures taken are proportionate to the damage, or 
threat of damage, from the pollution accident. From this article, the 
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases 
of Oil Pollution Casualties
260
 derives its legality. This convention was 
hastily drafted after a major oil spill on the high seas, off the English 
                                               
255 See 5.3.1; the Swedish supreme court decision NJA 2004:255 regarding marine 
pollution penalty for confirmed pollution in the EEZ of Sweden. 
256 UNCLOS article 231. Though, for discharges in the territorial sea, this is only a 
requirement for measures taken in proceedings. 
257 Including fishing, see UNCLOS article 221(1). 
258 UNCLOS article 221(1).  
259 UNCLOS article 221(2) defines maritime casualty for the purpose of this article as 
A collision of vessels, stranding or other incident of navigation, or other 
occurrence on board a vessel or external to it resulting in material damage 
or imminent threat of material damage to a vessel or cargo. 
260 Hereinafter referred to as the Intervention Convention. 
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coast.
261
 As mentioned previously, the flag state is always responsible for its 
vessels and, on the high seas, the flag state has exclusive jurisdiction unless 
otherwise stipulated in UNCLOS, e.g. article 221, or in an international 
convention.  
 
5.3.3.1 The Intervention Convention  
 
This convention was adopted at a Brussels’ Convention in 1969 when the 
need for available legal measures against foreign flagged vessels causing 
serious pollution on the high seas that threatens the coastal state, was 
acknowledged after the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967, where a Liberian-
flagged tanker hit a reef and leaked an estimated 60 000 tons of oil which 
caused serious pollution on the British and French coastline.
262
 The British 
government decided to bomb the vessel to set the remaining cargo oil on fire 
for the prevention of further pollution damage. This was done even though 
the vessel was in an area that at that time was considered the high seas and 
was thus only subject to the flag state jurisdiction, i.e. Liberia.
263
 The 
applicable convention at the time was the HSC which merely stipulates that 
the flag state has exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas, except when an 
international treaty or articles in the high seas convention provide otherwise. 
The available exceptions in this convention concerned primarily piracy and 
hot pursuit, nothing that would be applicable in the case of the Torrey 
Canyon disaster. The realization of the absence of an international 
convention approving such measures as those taken and discussed in the 
Torrey Canyon-situation was the starting point of the Intervention 
Convention.  
This convention is one exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag 
state for ships sailing the high seas. When certain conditions are met, a 
coastal state has jurisdiction, following a maritime casualty, to take 
appropriate measures for prevention and elimination of oil pollution that 
threaten the state’s coastline or similar area of interest. The requirement is 
that the threat of pollution is expected to bring “major harmful 
consequences” to the coastal state.264  
The convention contains a list of provisions that a state needs to obey e.g. 
that the state shall consult other affected states, there among the flag state, 
and that any subject that has an interest that might be affected by the 
proposed measures shall be informed and their opinions shall be heard 
before any measures is taken. It is only if the situation is of such emergency 
that it does not allow for these provisions to be followed, that a state is 
allowed to take those measures deemed necessary at the time without 
consulting and informing the flag state, other interested parties and various 
                                               
261 The Torrey Canyon disaster, discussed in part 5.3.3.1. 
262 Brownlie p. 240. 
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experts.
265
 The proposed measures are subject to proportionality of the 
pollution threat; they should not last longer than required by the situation, 
and the state must make sure not to violate other states’ rights and interests 
more than what is absolutely necessary.
266
 If the requirements set up by the 
convention are not met, the state is obliged to compensate any such damage 
caused by the taken measures.
267
 
In a conference in London in 1973, a protocol
268
 to the convention which in 
original only concerns pollution by oil, was adopted providing an extension 
of the convention making it applicable not only to oil, but to all harmful 
substances mentioned in a list provided by the IMO. 
A problem with this convention today is the requirement of imminent 
danger to the coastal state’s interest. After the prolongation of the territorial 
sea and the establishment of the EEZ in UNCLOS, the outer limit of the 
high seas was moved from 3 nautical miles to up to 200 nautical miles from 
the state’s baselines. At the time of the Torrey Canyon disaster, an oil 
pollution incident that took place on the high seas could well be considered 
as bringing imminent threat of serious consequences for the coastal state, 
but it can be discussed whether the same conclusion would be drawn for an 
oil discharge 200 nautical miles off the coast. This does not entail that a 
discharge on the high seas today cannot cause serious consequences on a 
coastal state, but rather that this particular convention does not support the 
measures that need to be taken in such event.  
 
5.3.4 Conclusion 
 
Protection of the marine environment from pollution is something that is 
very important to the international community and this is clearly illustrated 
in UNCLOS through the detailed regime concerning states’ rights and 
obligations. A vessel which is in violation of pollution regulations while in 
passage through a territorial sea loses its status as “innocent” and is subject 
to the coastal state’s full sovereignty. The same is applicable for a 
delinquent vessel which is by free will within the coastal state’s internal 
waters, even though the violation might have occurred in the EEZ.  
For vessels which are navigating in the territorial sea or the EEZ and are 
suspected of having violated pollution regulations, the coastal state has 
varying means to hold the delinquent vessels responsible and the means 
depend on the severity of the discharge and threat of damage. For severe 
discharges the coastal state has very extensive rights, in comparison with 
                                               
265 Intervention convention article III. 
266 Ibid. article V. 
267 Ibid. article VI. 
268 Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by Substances 
other than Oil (London, 2 November 1973). 
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minor discharges, where the coastal state may only require information from 
the vessel.   
On the high seas, a coastal state has very few opportunities to take action 
against a delinquent oil polluting vessel. The flag state has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the vessel, unless the pollution was a result of a 
navigational incident to which the state where the suspect is a national also 
may exercise penal jurisdiction. If the discharge threatens to damage coastal 
interests of the coastal state, then that state may take measures to protect 
itself from damage, if support for these measures can be found in customary 
international law, or in an international convention, e.g. the Intervention 
Convention, but even in this convention, the coastal state has to consult with 
the flag state and other interested parties before any measures can be taken. 
The criminal jurisdiction over the polluting incident in itself lies only with 
the flag state. 
 
5.4 Consequences of Concurrent 
Jurisdictions 
 
When more than one state have jurisdiction over a crime, there are no clear 
rules on who has priority over the others. But, states which have jurisdiction 
based on a form of jurisdiction with “lower status”, e.g. principles of 
nationality in comparison to the flag state, will normally, unless the crime 
and its punishment is of special interest to the state, waive its jurisdiction on 
behalf of the other state, on the basis of comity.
269
  
When disregarding comity between states, concurrent jurisdiction means, in 
theory, that all states with jurisdiction have equal right. This version of 
double jeopardy is not a violation of international law as it is in many 
national laws
270
, and it entails that all states may punish the crime in 
question according to its own national laws. Through agreements and 
conventions, states can amongst themselves agree to recognize each other’s 
judgements and apply the principle of ne bis in idem
271
. In Europe, before 
the EU, the Convention between the Member States of the European 
Communities on Double Jeopardy was drafted and signed by 11 states, but 
is today only in force in 5 states
272
. One reason for the very low interest in 
                                               
269 See part 2.3. 
270 In England this was established in Connelly v DPP 1964 AC 1254 HL and in Swedish 
law it can be found in the code of procedure (Rättegångsbalken 1942:740), chapter 30 
article 9. See Morosin, Michele N., “Double Jeopardy and International Law: Obstacles to 
Formulating a General Principle”. Nordic Journal of International Law 64: 261-274, 1995., 
p. 262. 
271 As an example, see The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 
14(7). 
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such a convention is that the principle of mutual recognition of foreign 
judgements has within the EU been an important issue for the community 
since 1998 and is today considered of fundamental value
273
. The principle of 
ne bis in idem can be found in article 54 of the Convention Implementing 
the Schengen Agreement in the EU
274
 as well as article 50 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
275
. 
For agreements like this to function properly, it is important that the states 
trust each other’s legal systems in regard of e.g. proportionality and human 
rights. If states do not trust each other to render a fair trial and judgement, a 
state might be tempted to ignore the agreement for the sake of punishing the 
criminal. In the EU, the community has placed high demands on the legal 
systems through the Lisbon treaty as well as various Framework Decisions, 
and this is supervised by the different organs within the EU.  
Another example of an agreement regulating double jeopardy is the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in which ne 
bis in idem is found in article 14(7). 
The essence of this short discussion is that in general international law 
where special agreements and conventions can be disregarded, the are no 
explicit rules of priority in a situation where one or more state have 
jurisdiction based on international law. Double jeopardy is thus no problem, 
and it might even be necessary to ascertain that serious criminals do not get 
punished too mildly
276
, but it should be kept in mind that for state parties to 
the ICCPR it is against human rights to exercise double jeopardy. 
 
5.5 Obligation to take action 
 
An interesting issue relating to enforcement jurisdiction is whether a coastal 
state can be obliged to take action against a delinquent vessel. For 
trafficking violations in customary international law this question would 
have to be answered in the negative, considering that the provisions in 
                                               
273 See Program of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions 
in criminal matters, (2001/C 12/02). 
274 Its full name is: Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985  
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UNCLOS have only placed responsibility on the flag state for the 
prevention and punishment of transport of slaves. The same goes for marine 
pollution where, even though all states are obliged to protect the marine 
environment, there is only a requirement on flag states to ensure that their 
vessels complies with international as well as national laws and regulations, 
while coastal states are merely provided with encouragement and 
possibilities to take action against polluting vessels.  
Regarding piracy, the situation at first seems different. The provisions in 
UNCLOS starts with the statement that all states should cooperate to repress 
acts of piracy.
277
 However, when reading the provision where acts of piracy 
are granted universal jurisdiction
278
, the convention has not placed any 
requirements on states, but merely provided jurisdiction for actions that 
states ‘may’ take for the suppression of this crime.279 Not even regarding 
right of visit can any requirements to take action be found, only possibilities 
if the state would feel like it.  
The reason for this lack of obligations on states to take actions against 
serious crimes is the state sovereignty. The very essence of sovereignty is 
that there is no one at a higher hierarchical level that can order a state to do 
something against the state’s policies. One place within international law 
where obligations on states can be found is in conventions.
280
 Although, in 
comparison with customary international law, the term obligation is 
misleading considering that conventions are ratified by states by their free 
will, and the commitment within are thus agreed upon voluntarily. This does 
not make any obligations less of a requirement, but states who wish, as a 
general policy, to remain passive in these aspects, can simply abstain from 
ratifying the convention in question or, if allowed, place a reservation on the 
provision regarding the issue at hand. 
 In most conventions, there are no express requirements on states to actually 
take actions against delinquent vessels, but merely a requirement to make 
certain acts criminal offences in national law. It can thus be argued whether 
an obligation to take action can be regarded as included within the scope of 
the convention. The OCC, as an example, has as one object the 
criminalisation of different acts, e.g. trafficking. The convention requires 
states to provide itself with jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag and 
encourages states to adopt the passive and active nationality principle. The 
question is thus, if it can be considered as against the core of the convention 
to only criminalise, but not actually act to suppress these crimes. If it can be 
regarded that to take action against delinquent vessels is included in the 
object of the convention, this would lead to the result that a state which has 
implemented the conventions and taken the necessary measures to fulfil the 
requirements of criminalisation, but later chooses not to follow its own 
national law, is in violation of the convention as a whole. This in turn, is a 
                                               
277 UNCLOS article 100. 
278 Ibid. article 105. 
279 Guilfoyle shares this conclusion, see p. 30.  
280 See SUA article 5 “Each State Party shall make the offences set forth in  
article 3 punishable…”  
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violation of international law, and as a result other states can hold the 
passive state responsible
281
. If this is not the case, the result would be that a 
state which chooses not to follow its own implementation of the convention 
would not be in violation of the convention, simply in violation of its own 
national law, something that other states cannot do anything about.  
In conclusion, it can be summarized that flag states can in theory be 
required to take action against its delinquent vessels, but coastal states do 
not have the obligation, but merely possibilities, to take action.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
281 Provided that there exist a competent forum that both states have agreed upon, e.g. the 
ICJ. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The discussions in the chapters above have illustrated when a coastal state 
may act if faced with one of these criminal activities. The crimes were 
chosen to reflect three serious crimes which pose a frequent threat to safe 
seas around the world. In international law, these activities are with in the 
three different ways, and those three together clearly illustrate how a coastal 
state may use international law to prevent and punish such criminality.  
First, the crime with the most extensive form of jurisdiction is piracy. This 
crime is at the top of the hierarchy of all serious international crimes, and 
one of very few criminal activities whose repression has been granted 
universal jurisdiction. Though the list of activities falling within the scope 
of piracy is very restrictive, the international community has tried to redeem 
this by drafting and ratifying the SUA convention, which does not constitute 
universal jurisdiction, but as close as can be agreed upon by states 
themselves. For criminal activities within the SUA convention to be 
regarded as part of piracy jus gentium, the whole understanding of piracy 
needs to change or develop, and for this, there must be evidence of opinio 
juris in this matter.  
Through these regimes of universal jurisdiction and the comprehensive SUA 
convention, states have quite extensive opportunities to deal with acts of 
piracy, if they choose to do so. Even though UNCLOS has placed 
responsibility on all states to cooperate in the repression of piracy, there 
exists no requirement in customary international law for unwilling states to 
take action against acts of piracy.  
The second crime and jurisdiction issue concerns transport of people subject 
to human trafficking. This crime cannot be found in customary international 
law, but transport of people subject to slavery can, and it is this author’s 
opinion that these two, in this context, overlaps in such a way as to make an 
inclusion of human trafficking to customary international law possible . This 
brings the result that all flag states are responsible, although not obliged, to 
take action against this type of criminal activity on the high seas, as well as 
in their territory. For coastal states of which customary international law 
have not posed a requirement to prevent this activity
282
, it will be up to each 
state to decide whether they want to criminalize this action in national law, 
and thus be able to take measures against delinquent vessels within their 
jurisdiction. States parties to the Palermo Protocol are required to 
criminalize these acts, but since this protocol as well as its convention is 
voluntary and does not constitute international customary law, it cannot be 
said to be a requirement in international law to criminalise the acts of human 
trafficking. 
                                               
282 The slavery provision in UNCLOS, which codifies customary international law, has 
only placed a requirement on the flag state to prevent and punish the use of its flag for this 
purpose. There is no mentioning of coastal, or other states’ duties in this regard. 
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The last criminal activity is that of non-accidental oil pollution. This legal 
regime is neither of universal nature like piracy, nor based on conventions 
with a possible foundation in customary international law like trafficking, 
but has quite a comprehensive basis regarding jurisdictions in UNCLOS 
itself. Within the EEZ and the territorial sea, the coastal state has actually 
quite extensive jurisdiction to take action against oil polluters, although this 
regime primarily concerns major pollution incidents, and notably, it is the 
many minor discharges that are of greatest threat to the environment, 
especially considering that the large spills are often caused by an accident, 
something that most often cannot be considered a criminal activity. For 
minor discharges, there are limited opportunities for the coastal state which 
mean that this is left to the responsibility of the flag state.  
On the high seas, a coastal state has very limited opportunities to take action 
against a delinquent vessel, especially when taking into account the fact that 
the Intervention Convention has become quite hard to use after the EEZ-
regime, and considering that it mainly involves the right to take 
preventive/damage control measures and does not concern the aftermath 
issues e.g. prosecution of the offender. 
Another way to regard the issue of jurisdiction is considering what states are 
allowed to do in each maritime zone. In the territorial sea, the coastal state 
has practically unlimited sovereignty with the sole exception of innocent 
passage which cannot be claimed by the offender when a crime has been 
committed. The next zone, the EEZ, is more complicated and it is important 
to examine the nature of the crime to see whether the coastal state may take 
action. In many cases, e.g. non-minor oil pollution and serious criminal 
activities, the coastal state has quite extensive opportunities to exercise 
jurisdiction, although not as extensive as in the territorial sea. 
It is in international law primarily the flag state that has jurisdiction when a 
vessel is outside the territory of a coastal state, but when certain conditions 
are met, e.g. universal jurisdiction or nationality principle, the range of 
states with possible jurisdiction can be expanded to ensure that it is not 
possible to escape punishment for serious criminality in international areas. 
 Through the discussed crimes, this thesis has illustrated on what legal 
grounds a coastal state may base its jurisdiction for a wide range of criminal 
activities and it has been concluded that there cannot be said to exist 
obligations for a state in international law to take action, merely 
opportunities for those states which are willing to work for safe seas. 
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